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Abstract: Debt buyers have flooded courts nationwide with col-
lection lawsuits against consumers. This article reports the find-
ings from the broadest in-depth study of debt buyer litigation 
outcomes yet undertaken. The study demonstrates that in debt 
buyer cases, (1) the vast majority of consumers lose the vast ma-
jority of cases by default the vast majority of the time; (2) con-
sumers had no lawyer in ninety-eight percent of the cases; and (3) 
those who filed a notice that they intended to defend themselves 
without an attorney fared poorly, both in court and in out of 
court settlements. 
This study challenges the notion that there is an “adver-
sary system” within the context of debt buyer lawsuits. The find-
ings suggest that no such adversary system exists for most de-
fendants in consumer debt cases. Instead, these cases exist in a 
“shadow system” with little judicial oversight, which results in 
mass produced default judgments.  
The procedural and substantive due process problems 
which are endemic in debt buyer cases call for heightened aware-
ness and remedial action by the bench, the bar, and the academy. 
As lawyers who are “public citizens, with a special responsibility 
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for the quality of justice,”1 the profession can do better. This arti-
































                                                 
 1  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 1 (2011). 
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“We’re watching a fight between two players, one a 
skilled repeat gladiator, and one who’s thrown into the 
ring for the first time and gets clubbed over the head be-
fore they even get a sense of what the rules are.”              
- Elizabeth Warren, 2006.2 
INTRODUCTION 
his paper examines the litigation outcomes achieved by a 
specific type of plaintiff: entities that purchase defaulted 
consumer debt from banks for pennies on the dollar, and then file 
lawsuits against millions of consumers for the full face value of 
the debt. Banks sell this junk debt after they charge it off pursu-
ant to Treasury Regulations, and then take the full face value of 
the debt as a loss for tax purposes.3 Junk debt arises primarily 
from credit cards and other unsecured debt.4 It is called “junk” 
not only because of its low price, but also because it is often sold 
pursuant to “as is” contracts with broad disclaimers of warranty, 
with little or no documentation other than an Excel spreadsheet 
listing of accounts.5 
                                                 
 2  Michael Rezendes & Francie Latour, No Mercy for Consumers, BOSTON 
GLOBE, July 30, 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/specials/debt/part1_main/ 
(quoting Elizabeth Warren). 
 3  This “loss” is comprised not only of principal loaned, but also of all ac-
crued interest, late fees, over-limit fees, and whatever other discretionary fees 
may have been added, all of which serve to increase the amount of the loss for 
tax purposes. The Uniform Retail Credit Classification and Account Manage-
ment Policy requires the bank to charge-off an account 180 days after delin-
quency. Uniform Retail Credit Classification and Account Management Poli-
cy, 65 Fed. Reg. 36903 (June 12, 2000), available at http://1.usa.gov/GTwzVz. 
See also Internal Revenue Code, Bad Debts, 26 U.S.C. § 166 (2012) (providing 
deduction for worthless debt); 26 C.F.R. § 1.166-2(d) (2012) (evidence of worth-
lessness of debt as applied to banks); Rev. Rul. 2001-59, 
http://1.usa.gov/GU4UGw. 
 4  Increasingly banks are starting to sell, and junk debt investors are start-
ing to purchase deficiencies from secured consumer debt, such as car loans, 
and foreclosure deficiencies. See infra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 5  According to a January, 2013 study by the Federal Trade Commission of 
over 5,000 portfolios of sale, four cents on the dollar is the national average, 
spanning the time frame between March and August of 2009. U.S. FEDERAL 
TRADE COMM’N, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF THE DEBT BUYING 
INDUSTRY ii (2013) [hereinafter STRUCTURE & PRACTICES], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/debtbuyingreport.pdf. Structure & Practices is 
the first major study of the inner workings of the debt buying industry, how-
ever it provides no data on the litigation behavior or success of debt buyers, a 
T 
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Lawsuits filed by junk debt buyers expose a business 
model that is, literally, the buying and selling of claims to be uti-
lized in litigation for profit.6 Short of voluntary payment, the 
primary goal of debt-buyer lawsuits is to turn unsecured debt into 
court judgments, fully secured and fully collectable through gar-
nishment and other enforcement proceedings. As is pointed out in 
the Federal Trade Commission’s 2009 report titled Broken Sys-
tem and elsewhere, in their rush to secure judgment, debt buyers 
often mislead consumers and courts.7 
There is a widespread belief that in our broken system, 
small claims courts have become an extension of the debt collec-
tion industry. There are anecdotal reports that more than 95% of 
all collection cases end in a judgment in favor of the collector.8 At 
                                                                                                                 
subject which is left to this and other studies. 
 6  Assume the following scenario which, for the sake of simplicity of illus-
tration, will use simple, rather than compound interest: on December 31, a 
consumer owes $1,000 on her credit card, all of which is principal and does not 
include any interest, late fees or other fees. She fails to pay her credit card bill, 
and never makes another payment. What happens? On February 1, she will 
receive a bill for the $1,000, plus 29.99% interest based on the annual percent-
age rate, plus a late fee for $39. She will continue to receive these charges for 
the next 5 months (for a total of 6 months, or 180 days until the creditor will 
“charge off” the account for tax purposes). By this time, the bill will be approx-
imately $1,394, or almost 40% higher than it was on the day that she defaulted. 
This $1,000 loan, which now includes an extra $400 tacked on since the day 
the consumer stopped paying, will be sold for $56 (assuming a sales price of 4 
cents on the dollar), and the consumer will then be sued by a debt buyer for 
$1,400, plus attorneys’ fees of 15%, or $210. (This assumes they will not also be 
seeking prejudgment interest of 29.99%). For the consumer, the price of de-
faulting has suddenly become 161% of the principal of the amount loaned. For 
the debt buyer who invested $56, the potential return on investment is 2,800%; 
$56 invested and $1,610 returned. 
 7  Regulate Junk Debt, FREDERICK NEWS-POST, Dec 18, 2011, 
http://www.fredericknewspost.com/archive/article_071a18fb-1f4c-5687-9899-
faafbcf30d9b.html (“Part of the confusion arising from this shady practice 
among consumers is whether the calls they receive are to collect legitimate 
debt, or whether they are being taken for a ride . . . A frightening angle to this 
is that junk debt purchasers can sue the alleged debtor based on little but a 
supporting affidavit.”). 
 8  See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: 
PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 7,  n. 18 (2010) 
[hereinafter BROKEN SYSTEM], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/07/debtcollectionreport.pdf; Jessica Silver-
Greenberg, Lender Drops Pursuit of Debt, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2011, at C1 
(“Roughly 94% of collection cases filed against borrowers result in default 
judgment in favor of the lender, according to industry estimates.”). 
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least one judge who handles debt buyer and collections cases re-
ports that in over 90% of all such collection cases filed, the credi-
tor lacks the requisite proof to prevail.9 Instead of proof, arguably 
creditors rely on a de facto system of “default judgment justice” 
wherein the creditors know that very few defendants will ever 
challenge the lawsuit, and overwhelmed courts and judges will 
simply enter default judgments in order to keep the flood of pa-
perwork from bringing the workflow to a halt. 
There is a developing literature which examines the multi-
tude of doctrinal and due process concerns that arise from this 
system of “default judgment justice.”10 The Federal Trade Com-
mission, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), 
the National Consumer Law Center, and many others have pub-
lished important studies,11 and academics have demonstrated rel-
atively recent but growing interest.12 
In separate studies of Texas and Indiana, Mary Spector 
and Judith Fox have done groundbreaking small-scale empirical 
                                                 
 9  Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Problems Riddle Moves to Collect Credit Card 
Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2012, at A1 (“‘I would say that roughly 90 percent 
of the credit card lawsuits are flawed and can’t prove the person owes the 
debt’ said Noach Dear, a civil court judge in Brooklyn . . . .”). See also William 
Glaberson, In New York, Some Judges Now Skeptical About Debt Collectors’ 
Claims, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2010, at A15. 
 10  See, e.g., RICK JURGENS & ROBERT J. HOBBS, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW 
CTR., THE DEBT MACHINE: HOW THE COLLECTION INDUSTRY HOUNDS 
CONSUMERS AND OVERWHELMS COURTS 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/debt-machine.pdf (“In pursuit of 
judgments, creditors and collectors have swamped small claims and other state 
courts with a torrent of lawsuits.”); BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 8; 
STRUCTURE & PRACTICES, supra note 5. 
 11  See sources cited supra note 10. 
 12  See, e.g., Judith Fox, Do We Have a Debt Collection Crisis? Some Cau-
tionary Tales of Debt Collection in Indiana, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 355 
(2011); Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, 2007 DEM. J. 8, 10 (2007) (“Anx-
iety and shame have become constant companions for Americans struggling 
with debt. Since 2000, families have filed nearly 10 million petitions for bank-
ruptcy. Today about one in every seven families in America is dealing with a 
debt collector.”); Elizabeth Warren & Oren Bar-Gill, Making Credit Safer, 175 
U. PA. L. REV. 101, 160 (2008) (noting the widespread negative effects of con-
sumer debts and that “[n]ot even death will insulate families from the sting of 
aggressive debt collectors. Sears, for example, had a special team to collect 
from bereaved families when a customer died still owing a credit balance—
even though the family had no legal obligation to pay these debts.”); Young 
Walgenkim, Killing “Zombie Debt” Through Clarity and Consistency in the 
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 65 (2011). 
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quantitative and qualitative analyses of state court filings in these 
cases.13 The National Center for State Courts has done a rough 
categorization of “contract” cases filed, most of which are collec-
tion cases.14 Important new analyses, notably by Dalié Jiménez, 
are emerging of the “as is” sales and purchase contracts which ex-
ist between original creditors and debt buyers, and between ini-
tial and subsequent purchasers.15 Regulatory actions, notably by 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), have re-
sulted in settlements, including one where JP Morgan Chase “nei-
ther admits nor denies” that in its collection litigation it filed false 
affidavits, filed false documents that resulted in financial errors 
in favor of the bank, and failed to have in place processes and 
systems to ensure the accuracy and integrity of accounts sold to 
debt buyers.16 In light of the flood of lawsuits, the anecdotal re-
ports regarding the high rates of default, and the findings of the 
regulators regarding widespread abuse, it is appropriate to do a 
broad scale statistical analysis of court filings and litigation out-
comes. 
This paper analyzes 4,400 cases filed in Maryland collec-
tion courts by eleven separate debt buyers, each of whom filed 
more than 1,000 cases per year during the 2009-2010 two year 
sample period.17 The subject debt buyers were selected because 
                                                 
 13  See discussion infra Part I.E. 
 14  See ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE 
COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 
STATE COURT CASELOADS 11 (2012), available at 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/other-
pages/~/media/microsites/files/csp/data%20pdf/csp_dec.ashx. 
The author has spoken with a researcher at NCSC to confirm this. 
 15  Dalié Jiménez, Illegality in the Sale and Collection of Consumer Debts, 
(December 5, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2250784. 
 16  Consent Order at Art. I, ¶ 2, Art. IV, ¶ 1(p), JPMorgan Chase Bank, 
N.A., No. 2013-138 (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep’t of 
the Treasury Sept. 18, 2013), available at 
http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2013-138.pdf. 
 17  The debt buyers were: 
Legal Name Name Used in Case Search 
Pasadena Receivables, Inc.  Pasadena 
Midland Funding LLC aka Midland 
Credit Management 
Midland 
Arrow Financial Services, LLC Arrow 
LVNV Funding, LLC LVNV 
Asset Acceptance, LLC Asset 
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they filed a large number of cases and, at the time they were se-
lected, they comprised a representative sample of large publicly 
traded national corporate plaintiffs as well as small closely held 
regional and local corporate plaintiffs.18 In order to capture the 
largest percentage of cases that had reached a judgment, dismis-
sal or other final disposition as of the cutoff date for gathering the 
data,19 the data sample is comprised of cases that were filed by 
the subject debt buyers between January 1, 2009 and December 
31, 2010.20 
This study uses a larger statistical sample with more met-
rics and more analysis than is available in prior studies. In con-
trast to the two principal recent statistical studies of debt buy-
ers,21 this study is not confined to a single court or county forum. 
Rather, the cases in this study’s sample were drawn from a pool 
of all 26 District Court jurisdictions in the state.22 
The empirical findings of this study confirm the wide-
spread belief that in litigation, debt buyers employ a high volume 
default judgment business model, and that their legal pleadings, 
evidence and tactics are rarely exposed to the adversary process. 
Principal findings of this study include: (1) about 1 in 4 cases filed 
were dismissed by the court because the summons was never 
served on the defendant; (2) less than 2 in 10 defendants who 
were served with a summons filed a response (known in Mary-
land as a “Notice of Intention to Defend”); (3) in almost 7 out of 
10 cases, debt buyers obtained judgments against defendants in 
                                                                                                                 
Portfolio Recovery Associates Portfolio 
Cavalry Portfolio Services LLC Cavalry 
Fradkin & Weber, PA Fradkin 
Advantage Assets II, INC Advantage 
North Star Capital Acquisition North Star 
Atlantic Credit & Finance, INC Atlantic 
 
 18  There has since been some consolidation in the industry. See infra note 
115. 
 19  Cutoff date was March 31, 2012. 
 20  Of the 4,400 cases sampled, as of the March 31, 2012 cutoff date, all but 
381 cases (8.65%) had reached final disposition through a money judgment, 
bankruptcy, dismissal or settlement. 
 21  See discussion of Spector and Fox studies infra Part I.E. 
 22  Maryland has 26 counties. The District Court has exclusive original ju-
risdiction over small claims ($5,000 or less), and concurrent jurisdiction with 
the Circuit Court on claims over $5,000 up to $30,000. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & 
JUD. PROC. §§ 3-401, 3-405 (West 2011). 
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an average amount of more than $3,000; (4) the vast majority of 
cases do not result in a voluntary settlement; (5) more than 99% 
of the judgments against defendants were obtained without a tri-
al; (6) fewer than 2% of defendants were represented by a lawyer, 
and those who did have a lawyer achieved far better outcomes 
than those who did not have a lawyer; and (7) based on the 2010 
census data, there appears to be a disparate impact on racial mi-
norities. 
The data and analysis of this study has important implica-
tions for advocates, judges, litigants, legislators, regulators, policy 
makers and academics. 
This paper is divided into four parts. Part I describes the 
nature of the debt buying and debt collection industry, and sur-
veys the existing literature on lawsuits filed by debt buyers. Part 
II describes the methodology of the study and reports its results. 
Part III contains my analysis and draws conclusions. Part IV con-
tains my recommendations for further study and action. 
I.  THE DEBT INDUSTRY AND PREVIOUS STUDIES 
A.  Debt Collectors 
Debt collection cases have concerned scholars and policy 
makers for decades. In 1974, David Caplovitz published Con-
sumers in Trouble, which constituted the first broad empirical 
study of consumers facing debt collection in the United States.23 
In his Foreword to the Caplovitz study, United States Senator 
William Proxmire concluded that when it comes to collection of 
consumer debt, “[o]ur legal system benefits the unscrupulous and 
penalizes the weak.”24 Many of Caplovitz’s findings from more 
than forty years ago still apply to today’s “consumers in trouble.” 
Caplovitz found that consumers who default on financial obliga-
tions are rarely the “deadbeats” of popular myth, a fact which 
remains true today, and which even the collection industry ad-
                                                 
 23  DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS 
IN DEFAULT xii (1974). Caplovitz wrote about law suits filed by original credi-
tors; not the debt buyers of this study, because debt buyers did not exist in 
1974. His study was comprised largely of in-person interviews of debtors.  He 
found that in many cases, these consumers had valid defenses to the lawsuits. 
 24  Id. 
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mits.25 He also found that the people most likely to be in trouble 
were the poor,26 and that consumers usually get into trouble due 
to circumstances beyond their control.27 Caplovitz concluded that 
when they do get into trouble, consumers face a debt collection 
court system that is unfair to them.28 It is notable that the 
Caplovitz study was published in 1974, three years before the 
passage of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, which was de-
signed to correct collection abuses.29  
When it comes to the perceived fundamental unfairness of 
the debt collection system, little has changed in the intervening 
years. In 2010, the Federal Trade Commission concluded that in 
today’s collection system, “neither litigation nor arbitration cur-
rently provides adequate protection for consumers. The system 
for resolving disputes about consumer debts is broken.”30 Some of 
the hallmarks of this broken system include lack of data integrity, 
lack of proof, inadequate documentation, robo-signing and other 
unfair and deceptive acts and practices.31 Judges, advocates, aca-
demics, federal regulators,32 state regulators,33 Congress,34 and the 
                                                 
 25  CAPLOVITZ, supra note 23, at x (Foreword by William Proxmire); Mike 
Bevel, You’re Doing it Wrong: Misrepresenting the Collection Industry, 
INSIDEARM, April 29, 2011, http://www.insidearm.com/opinion/youre-doing-
it-wrong-misrepresenting-the-collection-industry/ (“At no point would a repu-
table collection agency doing its job correctly ever refer to a consumer as a 
deadbeat.”). 
 26  CAPLOVITZ, supra note 23, at 4. 
 27  48% of consumers were in trouble because of a loss of income and 11% 
due to unexpected increases in their expenses, such as medical bills. Id. at 53. 
Only 5% were what Caplovitz regarded as the stereotype of “deadbeat” debt-
ors. Id. at 54. 
 28  Id. at 291-301. 
 29  Sen. Proxmire, who wrote the foreword to Consumers in Trouble, was 
also chair of the Senate Banking Committee during the passage of the FDCPA. 
 30  BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 8, at i. 
 31  “Robo-signing” can include signing affidavits which falsely claim to be 
based on personal knowledge, and having third parties sign affidavits in the 
name of the alleged affiant. The later practice was recently condemned by 
Maryland’s Court of Appeals. Atty. Griev. Comm’n. v. Dore, 73 A.3d 161, 178 
(Md. 2013). 
 32  CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES 
ACT ANNUAL REPORT (2013). The FTC and CFPB jointly held a roundtable 
on debt collection in mid-2013. See Life of a Debt: Data Integrity in Debt Col-
lection, FED. TRADE COMM’N (June 6, 2013) [hereinafter Life of a Debt], 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2013/06/life-debt-data-
integrity-debt-collection. Since the passage of the Fair Debt Collection Practic-
es Act, the Federal Trade Commission has been responsible for consumer pro-
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tection in debt collection. The Dodd-Frank Act shifted much of that responsi-
bility from the FTC to the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau. The CFPB now shares overall enforcement responsibility with the FTC 
and other agencies including the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and 
the Federal Communications Commission. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 11-203, §1089, 124 Stat. 1376, 2092-93 
(2010) (amending the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1692 et 
seq.). The CFPB can prescribe rules regarding debt collection, issue guidance, 
collect data, undertake research and conduct educational campaigns. In par-
ticular, the CFPB has the power to regulate large non-bank actors on consum-
er financial services including debt collection, and has recently begun to use 
that authority. It is anticipated that the CFPB will promulgate new rules on 
debt buying in the near future. 
 33  Maryland has been a particularly active regulator in this field. For ex-
ample, the following enforcement actions were undertaken in the last few 
years, contributing to the staying or dismissal of tens of thousands of debt buy-
er lawsuits: Summary Order to Cease and Desist, Portfolio Recovery Group, 
No. CFR-FY2012-074 (Md. State Collection Agency Licensing Bd. Apr. 9, 
2013), available at 
http://www.dllr.state.md.us/finance/consumers/pdf/portfoliorecc&d.pdf; Set-
tlement Agreement and Consent Order at 5-6, Credit Service, LLC, No. CFR-
FY2012-077 (Md. State Collection Agency Licensing Bd. Oct. 14, 2011), avail-
able at 
http://www.dllr.state.md.us/finance/consumers/pdf/creditservicessettlement.pd
f (“Filing actions . . . intended to obtain judgment on affidavit . . . but which 
contained affidavits that were based . . . on the affiant’s knowledge, infor-
mation and belief, a standard insufficient to obtain such judgments . . . 
[c]laiming and receiving unauthorized attorney’s fees . . . [c]laiming and receiv-
ing prejudgment interest that included compound interest and misrepresenting 
the correct amount of principal and interest in the documents filed . . . [f]iling 
complaints alleging ownership of particular consumer claims but which com-
plaints contained invalid or deficient assignment documents . . . filing com-
plaints beyond the 3-year statute of limitations . . . [m]ailing collection letters to 
consumers threatening to file lawsuits based on consumer claims that were al-
ready beyond the 3-year statute of limitations”); Settlement Agreement and 
Consent Order at 4-5, Sunshine Financial Group, LLC, Nos. CFR-FY2011-
135 & CFR-FY2012-019 (Md. State Collection Agency Licensing Bd. Sept. 9, 
2011), available at 
http://www.dllr.state.md.us/finance/consumers/pdf/sunshinesettlement.pdf; 
Settlement Agreement at 4, Worldwide Asset Management et al., No. DFR-
FY2010-221 (Md. State Collection Agency Licensing Bd. Aug. 10, 2010), avail-
able at 
http://www.dllr.state.md.us/finance/consumers/pdf/worldwidesettlement.pdf 
(“[A] debt collector . . . may not ‘[c]laim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a right 
with knowledge that the right does not exist.’ . . . [t]he Agency has reasonable 
grounds to believe that respondents engaged in unlicensed collection agency 
activities and that all Respondents engaged in other violations . . . referenced 
above.”). See also Press Release, Office of Commc’ns & Pub. Affairs, Md. Judi-
ciary, Thousands of District Court of Maryland Cases Dismissed (Mar. 17, 
2011), available at 
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media have broadly exposed these and other problems unique to 
debt collection.35 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.courts.state.md.us/media/news/2011/pr20110317.html (announcing 
the dismissal of 10,168 Midland Funding cases filed between January 15 2007-
January 15, 2010 and noting also that 27,000 Mann Bracken cases were dis-
missed in 2010); Press Release, Office of Commc’ns & Pub. Affairs, Md. Judi-
ciary, District Court of Maryland Dismisses Sunshine Financial Group Debt 
Collection Cases (Sept. 21, 2011), available at 
http://www.courts.state.md.us/media/news/2011/pr20110921.html (announcing 
that 314 cases were dismissed and 323 reduced to remove atty’s fees.); Press 
Release, Office of Commc’ns & Pub. Affairs, Md. Judiciary, District Court of 
Maryland Dismisses Thousands More Debt Collection Cases (Oct. 11, 2012), 
available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/media/news/2012/pr20121011.html. 
 34  Press Release, Sen. Sherrod Brown, Following Call to Rein in Debt Col-
lection Industry, Brown Holds Hearing on Efforts to End Consumer Abuses 
(July 17, 2013), available at 
http://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/following-call-to-rein-
in-debt-collection-industry-brown-holds-hearing-on-efforts-to-end-consumer-
abuses (“Former bank employees have reported that they were instructed to 
‘[g]o ahead and sign’ affidavits verifying consumer debts, even when they 
didn’t have documentation . . . [w]hen debt buyers purchase these loans from 
the biggest banks, they sign ‘as is’ contracts, giving banks cover to offload 
debts for collection that may be inaccurate, incomplete, or legally uncollect-
able.” (quoting Sen. Sherrod Brown)). 
 35  See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, In Civil Court, Reckoning Awaits Those Who Got 
Seduced by Plastic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2008, at A19; Jeff Horwitz, It’s Robo 
Redux: Card Lawsuits Stalk Banks, AM. BANKER, Jan. 31, 2012, at 1. The Bos-
ton Globe published a very important series of articles in 2006, which paved 
the way for other reporters. See Rezendes & Latour, supra note 2 (mentioning 
the activities of the Goldstone brothers – Mass. Debt buyer) (“[A]lmost unno-
ticed by policy-makers, many millions of Americans have slid, or been pushed, 
into a debtor’s hell[.]”) (Quoting Elizabeth Warren, “We’re watching a fight 
between two players, one a skilled repeat gladiator, and one who’s thrown into 
the ring for the first time and gets clubbed over the head before they even get a 
sense of what the rules are.”); Beth Healy, Dignity Faces a Steamroller, 
BOSTON GLOBE, July 31, 2006, 
http://www.boston.com/news/specials/debt/part2_main/ (“The ‘people’s court’ 
has become the collectors’ court . . . [i]t is a de facto arm of a fast-growing and 
aggressive industry that has swamped court dockets with lawsuits[.]”) (re-
counting the case of a Judge Barrett, who ordered a defendant to surrender her 
jewelry or be imprisoned) (“Often, debtors are treated with less courtesy than 
the accused felons in the criminal court across the hall, and their rights are less 
respected.”); Walter V. Robinson & Michael Rezendes, Enforcers’ Might Goes 
Unchecked, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1, 2006, 
http://www.boston.com/news/specials/debt/part3_main/ (describing the abuses 
of Boston “Constables” publicly appointed collectors); Walter V. Robinson & 
Beth Healy, Regulators, Policy Makers Seldom Intervene, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Aug. 2, 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/specials/debt/part4_main/ (quoting 
Donald Friedman of debt buyer Liberty Point Corp. “[debt buying] is one of 
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Nowhere is the breakdown in the collections system more 
evident than in the context of lawsuits filed by junk debt buyers. 
Junk debt buyers are even further removed from personal rela-
tionships with consumers than the commercial lenders in the 
Caplovitz study. It is therefore unsurprising that these investors 
in junk debt would resort to “bureaucratic procedures to collect 
debts,” a trend that has made debt collection the most complained 
about business under the Federal Trade Commission’s jurisdic-
tion.36 
B. Debt Buying37 
The highly successful debt buyer business model is simple 
to describe. First, buy debts for pennies on the dollar;38 second, 
clog the courts with small claims lawsuits; third, rely on the fact 
that defendants are not likely to contest the cases or show up in 
courts; and finally, bank on the fact that small claims court judg-
es often do not enforce basic rules of evidence or procedure in un-
contested cases. 
Over the past two decades, the seemingly easy money to 
be made from investing in and pursuing junk debt has caused the 
                                                                                                                 
the sexiest, one of the most financially lucrative businesses you can get into.”) 
(“[I]n spite of all this, there is an eerie silence among regulators, policy makers, 
and legislators.”). 
 36  STRUCTURE & PRACTICES, supra note 5, at i. 
 37  This section contains a brief overview of the junk debt buyer industry. 
For a more detailed overview, see CLAUDIA WILNER & NASOAN SHEFTEL-
GOMES, LEGAL AID SOC’Y ET AL., DEBT DECEPTION: HOW DEBT BUYERS 
ABUSE THE LEGAL SYSTEM TO PREY ON LOWER-INCOME NEW YORKERS 
(2010), available at 
http://www.nedap.org/pressroom/documents/DEBT_DECEPTION_FINAL_
WEB.pdf; RACHEL TERP & LAUREN BOWNE, EAST BAY CMTY. LAW CTR. & 
CONSUMERS UNION OF UNITED STATES, PAST DUE: WHY DEBT COLLECTION 
PRACTICES AND THE DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY NEED REFORM NOW (2001), 
available at http://www.ebclc.org/documents/Past_Due_Report_2011.pdf; 
JURGENS & HOBBS, supra note 10; Peter A. Holland, The One Hundred Billion 
Dollar Problem in Small Claims Court: Robo-Signing and Lack of Proof in 
Debt Buyer Cases, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 259 (2011). 
 38  The FTC found that the range for non-mortgage debt examined in their 
study was between 1.5 and 6.6 cents on the dollar for charged-off portfolios. 
STRUCTURE & PRACTICES, supra note 5, at D-6. The average across all debt 
buyer activity was about 4 cents on the dollar. Id. at ii.  In fact, some debt sells 
for less than one penny on the dollar. 
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industry to explode39 to the point where today the face value of 
purchased credit card debt exceeds $100 billion annually.40 The 
explosive growth of this industry has created an array of chal-
lenges to the courts, to the consumer defendants, and to notions of 
constitutional due process. One of the most basic challenges is the 
fact that consumers do not recognize the name of the debt buyer 
plaintiff, or the amount being sued on. This adds to the exceed-
ingly high rate of default judgments.41 
         The confusion that results from the buying and selling of le-
gal claims was observed by Lord Coke almost 500 years ago 
when he described: 
[T]he great wisdom and policy of the sages and founders 
of our law, who have provided, that no possibility, right, 
title, nor thing in action, shall be granted or assigned to 
strangers, for that would be the occasion of multiplying 
of contentions and suits, of great oppression of the peo-
ple. 42 
Lord Coke’s observation foreshadowed what Caplovitz 
eventually concluded: 
[T]he breakdown in credit transactions that results in 
lawsuits is . . . very much a product of the anonymity of 
consumer transactions in urban America. It is this lack 
                                                 
 39  Modern day debt buying is often said to have originated with the sale of 
debts by the FDIC and the Resolution Trust Corporation in the wake of the 
savings and loan crisis. Robert M. Hunt, Collecting Consumer Debt in Ameri-
ca, BUS. REV., Q2 2007, at 11, available at 
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/business-
review/2007/q2/hunt_collecting-consumer-debt.pdf; STRUCTURE & 
PRACTICES, supra note 5 at 17. The debt buying market is now dominated by 
large participants. Id. at i (the nine largest debt buyers held over 75% of debts 
sold in 2008); Defining Larger Participants of the Consumer Debt Collection 
Market, 77 Fed. Reg. 65,775 (Oct. 31, 2012) (amending 12 C.F.R. pt. 1090 to 
define larger participants in the consumer debt collection industry, including 
debt buyers). 
 40  Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Boom in Debt Buying Fuels Another Boom – 
In Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2010, at A1 (“More than 450 debt buyers 
scooped up an estimated $100 billion in distressed loans last year, according to 
the latest estimates by Kaulkin Ginsburg, a debt-collection industry adviser.”); 
The FTC’s report utilized data on debt portfolios worth $143 billion, bought 
by the 9 largest debt buyers. STRUCTURE & PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 8. 
 41  See Life of A Debt, supra note 32. 
 42  Lampet’s Case, (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 994 (K.B.) 997 (emphasis added). 
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of knowledge of each other by the parties to these trans-
actions that contributes to mistrust, misinterpretations 
of the reasons for the default, and the employment of 
harsh, bureaucratic procedures to collect debts. In this 
respect we are dealing . . . with an urban problem in 
which trust, based on personal relationships, is absent. 43 
Today’s debt buyer lawsuits involve the purchase, sale, 
and suing upon old, unreliable, inaccurate documentation of 
abandoned consumer credit accounts, consisting primarily of 
lending products such as subprime credit cards with (what used 
to be) usurious interest rates,44 accumulated late fees, over limit 
fees, and monthly usage fees.  Debt buyers pay pennies on the 
dollar for accounts abandoned by the original creditor, sold “as is” 
with little or no documentation, and lots of disclaimers of warran-
ty.45 
Junk debt investors purchase consumer debt from large 
financial institutions in portfolios, containing thousands of indi-
vidual debts. Although the cases in this study are comprised pri-
marily of credit card debt, it is important to note that all kinds of 
consumer debt is being bought and sold today, including mort-
gage foreclosure deficiencies.46 Scholars have documented some 
                                                 
 43  CAPLOVITZ, supra note 23, at 9. 
  44  In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a national bank may export 
the home state’s interest rate, regardless of state usury caps. Marquette Na-
tional Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corporation, 439 U.S. 
299, 308, n.24 (1978). 
 45  Typical disclaimers of warranty include that the account may already 
be satisfied, that the debtor may have prevailed at trial, that the debtor was 
the victim of identity theft, that the debtor declared bankruptcy, that the ac-
count is beyond the statute of limitations, that the debtor is dead, that the 
amount of the alleged debt is only approximate, and that documentation may 
not exist. See, e.g., Loan Sale Agreement By and Among FIA Card Services, 
N.A. and CACH, LLC (Apr. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Loan Sale Agreement], 
available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/329733/fia-to-
cach-forward-flow.pdf. See also Jiménez, supra note 15. 
 46  Debt buyer interest in foreclosure deficiency judgments has been known 
since at least 2011. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, The House Is Gone But The Debt 
Lives On, WALL ST. J., Oct 1, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405311190406060457657253202
9526792 (“The increase in deficiency judgments has sparked a growing sec-
ondary market. Sophisticated investors are ‘ravenous for this debt and ramp-
ing up their purchases[.]”). See also Douglas French, The New Deficiency Mar-
ket, MISES ECON. BLOG, (Oct 4, 2011), http://archive.mises.org/18607/the-new-
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of the problems inherent in this business model.47 More recently, 
regulators and mainstream media have expressed concern regard-
ing the “as is” terms, without representations or warranties, on 
which these debts are purchased. The FTC and the OCC in par-
ticular have questioned the adequacy of the information debt 
buyers receive with purchased debts.48 The FTC’s Structure and 
Practices study revealed that debt sale and purchase agreements 
between the creditor and the debt buyers generally limit the 
availability of key documents, such as account statements and 
credit agreements.49 Further, the debt sale agreements often dis-
claim the accuracy of the information provided and explicitly dis-
claim warranties of title, validity, enforceability, collectability, 
and accuracy.50 In 2009, the FTC found that information provid-
ed to debt buyers was “so deficient that collectors [sought] pay-
                                                                                                                 
deficiency-market/. This trend only seems likely to increase, as suits on defi-
ciency judgments generally rise. See Kimbriell Kelly, Lenders Seek Court Ac-




 47  Lauren Goldberg, Dealing in Debt: The High-Stakes World of Debt Col-
lection After FDCPA, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 711 (2005) (an early report on abusive 
collection by debt buyers); Holland, supra note 37 (reporting abuses in the 
small claims jurisdiction in Maryland); Sam Glover, Has the Flood of Debt 
Collection Lawsuits Swept Away Minnesotans’ Due Process Rights, 35 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1115 (2008) (reporting the “flood” of collection suits and 
consequent abuses in Minnesota); Neil L. Sobol, Protecting Consumer From 
Zombie-Debt Collectors, NEW MEXICO L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2350555. An additional important aspect of the 
problem, not treated in this article, is the negative impact on the creditworthi-
ness of debtors who fall victim to abusive collection practices. See Mary Spec-
tor, Where the FCRA Meets the FDCPA: The Impact of Unfair Collection 
Practices on the Credit Report, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 479 (2013). 
 48  STRUCTURE & PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 35-36. 
 49  Id. 
 50  Jiménez, supra note 15, at 4. Note however that representatives of the 
debt collection industry deny that this is current practice. See Life of a Debt, 
supra note 32; Shining a Light on the Consumer Debt Industry: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Protection of the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. (July 17, 2013) 
[hereinafter Statement of Corey Stone], available at 
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&Fil
eStore_id=293a7183-c6c6-4753-97a6-a44c859dc093 (testimony of Corey Stone, 
Assistant Director, Office of Deposits, Cash, Collections, and Reporting Mar-
kets of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).  These denials are difficult 
to verify, because debt buyers usually refuse to produce the contracts. 
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ment from the wrong consumer or demand[ed] the wrong 
amount.”51 
The lack of proof, disclaimers of warranty and unreliable 
record keeping have led to significant criticism and threats of 
regulatory action to strengthen supervision of the debt buying 
business.52 This criticism and the threat of regulatory intervention 
have already led one major bank to cease its sale of defaulted 
consumer debt altogether.53 Despite these problems, the debt buy-
ing industry remains strong and has even begun to expand inter-
nationally, with industry leader Encore Capital recently acquir-
ing the English debt buyer Cabot Financial.54 
C.  Debt Buyer Collection Litigation 
The debt buying business model has been to flood the 
courts across the country, resulting in hundreds of millions of dol-
lars of default judgments entered against consumers. 
Maryland provides a good example of how this business 
model has affected some courts. In two of Maryland’s largest ju-
risdictions, consumers sued by debt buyers for only a few hun-
dred or a few thousand dollars are summoned to appear in a 
courtroom in order to engage in “resolutions conferences” with 
sophisticated plaintiffs’ lawyers.55 These meetings occur inside of 
                                                 
 51  FED. TRADE COMM’N, COLLECTION CONSUMER DEBTS: THE 
CHALLENGE OF CHANGE 22 (2009). 
 52  See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
 53  Maria Aspan & Jeff Horwitz, Chase Halts Card Debt Sales Ahead of 
Crackdown, AM. BANKER, Jul 1, 2013, 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_126/chase-halts-card-debt-sales-
ahead-of-crackdown-1060326-1.html. 
 54  Saabira Chaudhuri, Encore Capital Buys Majority Stake in Cabot 
Credit For $192 Million, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130530-704282.html. 
 55  Maria Aspan, Courthouse ‘Rocket Dockets’ Give Debt Collectors Edge 
Over Debtors, AM. BANKER, Feb. 11, 2013, 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/179_29/courthouse-rocket-dockets-
give-debt-collectors-edge-over-debtors-1065545-1.html (describing the “resolu-
tion conferences”).  It is notable that the American Banker article comes more 
than four years after Baltimore Sun editorial called for an end to these “rocket 
dockets,” noting that “The docket has offered few or no safeguards for defend-
ants and carried the imprimatur of the judicial system . . . .” Editorial, Reform 
‘Rocket Docket’, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 27, 2009, 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2009-01-27/news/0901260050_1_district-court-
docket-maryland-hospitals. 
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courtrooms in which no judge is present to oversee the proceed-
ings.56 If the consumer fails to appear, the file goes to a judge for 
consideration of entry of an uncontested “affidavit judgment.” On 
the other hand, if the consumer does appear and demands a trial, 
there is no guarantee that a trial will be held on that date. Despite 
the fact that there is no judge present, the continued existence of 
these proceedings is premised on the notion that these “confer-
ences” are a type of “pretrial conference” contemplated under the 
Maryland Rules.57 
Like any other judgment creditor, once a debt buyer has 
secured a judgment, it has access to a panoply of enforcement 
methods.58 The most powerful of these is a supplementary pro-
ceeding to force the judgment debtor to appear in court in order 
to provide information about the debtor’s assets.59 The debtor is 
summoned to court to answer questions about their assets and in-
come, to enable the creditor to locate assets to seize, accounts and 
employers to garnish and real property on which liens can be 
placed.  If debtors do not appear in court, they risk being found in 
contempt and arrested, a phenomenon which Lea Shepard called 
“Creditor’s Contempt.”60 In many arrest warrant cases, judges 
will order that the bond which the defendant paid be released to 
the judgment creditor.61 As both Shepard and Caplovitz ob-
                                                 
 56  Aspan, supra note 55 (“What’s missing is a judge or other neutral mod-
erator.”). 
 57  Id. (noting that the judges of the Maryland District Court defend the 
practice and claim that it is voluntary). Although the Maryland Rules allow 
“pretrial conferences” to be ordered sua sponte in the District Court, the specif-
ic Rule at issue appears to contemplate a proceeding at which a judge is pre-
sent. MD. R. 3-504(a) (“The court . . . may direct all parties to appear before 
it”); MD. R. 3-504(b-c)(listing administrative matters to be raised at the hearing 
such as witnesses to be relied upon and amendment of pleadings, and for the 
court to enter an order on such matters).  In contrast, in 2008, here is how the 
Baltimore Sun described the proceedings, which have changed little since then: 
“Lawyers call up debtors one at a time to work out payment plans in rapid, on-
the-spot settlements. Other days, lawyers haggle with debtors in the court-
house hallways. When cases go to judges, hospitals typically win after hearings 
that last a few minutes or less.”  Fred Schulte & James Drew, Their Day In 
Court, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 22, 2008, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2008-
12-22/news/0812210157_1_maryland-hospitals. 
 58  MD. R. 3-631. 
 59  Known in Maryland as “Discovery in Aid of Enforcement.” MD. R. 3-
633. 
 60  Lea K. Shepard, Creditor’s Contempt, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1509 (2011). 
 61  Id. at 1550. 
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served, creditor’s contempt has the effect of extending the long-
banned practice of imprisonment for debt into the twenty-first 
century.62 
Imprisonment for contempt arising out of small consumer 
debt has attracted local and national media attention.63 Policy 
makers have begun to respond, expressing concern and launching 
investigations into the practice.64 Encore Capital disavowed ar-
rest as a debt collection device due to negative publicity,65 and 
others have criticized the tactic in the debt collection industry.66 
However, the problem continues to cause concern around the 
country.67 
D.  The Maryland Experience 
Maryland has been a leader is combating the unique prob-
lems created by debt buyer litigation, as evidenced by effective 
                                                 
 62  Id. at 1543-1544; CAPLOVITZ, supra note 23. 
 63  Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Welcome to Debtors’ Prison, 2011 Edition, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2011 [hereinafter Debtor’s Prison, 2011 Edition], 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870439650457620455381
1636610 (noting that more than a third of states allow arrest for debt and that 
over 5,000 warrants had been issued since 2010); Alain Sherter, Jailed for $280: 
The Return of Debtors’ Prisons, CBS NEWS (Apr. 20, 2012, 1:04 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505144_162-57417654/jailed-for-$280-the-
return-of-debtors-prisons/ (noting the problem and discussing the case of a 
woman imprisoned for $280 alleged debt, which she did not owe, and quoting 
Illinois Att’y Gen. Lisa Madigan “‘Too many people have been thrown in jail 
simply because they’re too poor to pay their debts.’”); Susie An, Unpaid Bills 
Land Some Debtors Behind Bars, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 12, 2011, 12:01 
AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/12/12/143274773/unpaid-bills-land-some-
debtors-behind-bars. 
 64  Welcome to Debtors’ Prison, 2011 Edition, supra note 63 (noting the 
state of Illinois and the FTC had launched investigations into the practice). 
 65  Id. 
 66  Mike Bevel, Debt Collectors (Don’t) Want to Send Debtors to Prison, 
INSIDEARM.COM, (Nov. 23, 2011, 11:48 AM), 
http://www.insidearm.com/daily/debt-collection-news/accounts-receivables-
management/debt-collectors-dont-want-to-send-debtors-to-prison/ (criticizing 
Silver-Greenberg and other articles reporting on the same issue, apparently on 
the grounds that such arrests are not directly “because of debt”, without deny-
ing that such arrests are requested by collectors). 
 67  See, e.g., Martha C. White, Lenders Use a New Dirty Trick to Jail You 
for Small Debts, TIME, Aug. 28, 2012, 
http://business.time.com/2012/08/28/lenders-use-a-new-dirty-trick-to-jail-you-
for-small-debts/. 
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private class action litigation,68 aggressive enforcement actions by 
the state Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation,69 and 
measures taken by the Chief Judge of the District Court of Mary-
land, who has dismissed more than 20,000 debt buyer cases since 
2010.70 Most notably, effective as of January 1, 2012, Maryland 
adopted comprehensive amendments to its procedural court rules 
for obtaining default judgments, also known as “affidavit judg-
ment,” in uncontested cases in the “small claims” division of its 
District Court.71 Despite these efforts, Maryland courts remain 
flooded with debt buyer lawsuits, and neither the basic business 
model nor the ultimate outcome of these cases—massive default 
judgments—have been altered. 
E.  Existing Studies of Debt Buyer Activity 
One of the first reports on perceived litigation abuse by 
debt buyers came in a series of Boston Globe articles in 2006.72 
The Globe reported on threats of imprisonment,73 gross inequality 
in the courtroom,74 and shoddy evidence.75 Although these abuses 
were recognized early, they have persisted. Since 2006, debt buy-
                                                 
 68  See Bradshaw v. Hilco Receivables, LLC, 765 F. Supp. 2d 719 (D. Md. 
2011) (holding that “Hilco violated the [FDCPA] in filing lawsuits without a 
license in violation of the Maryland Collection Agency Licensing Act”); Hauk 
v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 749 F. Supp. 2d 358 (D. Md. 2010) (same); Finch v. 
LVNV Funding, LLC, 71 A.3d 193 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013) (holding that 
judgments obtained when the plaintiff was not a licensed debt collector are 
void) cert. denied 77 A.3d 1084 (Md. 2013). 
 69  See, supra Note 33. 
 70  Id. 
 71  MD. R. 3-306. For text and commentary on the extensive changes, see 
NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE CHANGES: 171st REPORT, STANDING 
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, MD. CT. OF APPEALS 31-
47 (2011). 
 72  Rezendes & Latour, supra note 2; Healy, supra note 35; Robinson & 
Rezendes, supra note 35; Robinson & Healy, supra note 35. 
 73  Healy, supra note 35 (“[S]uch threats are a common tool, both in small-
claims court and in the district court civil sessions.”). 
 74  See id.; Rezendes & Latour, supra note 2 (quoting Professor (now Sena-
tor) Elizabeth Warren, “We’re watching a fight between two players, one a 
skilled repeat gladiator, and one who’s thrown into the ring for the first time 
and gets clubbed over the head before they even get a sense of what the rules 
are.”) 
 75  Rezendes & Latour, supra note 2 (recounting the case of a disabled vet-
eran sued for debt while deployed; an affidavit filed by the plaintiff falsely 
claimed he was not in the military.). 
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ers have attracted increasing attention from advocates, regula-
tors, and scholars.76 In 2009, a legal support program for munici-
pal employees published Where’s the Proof? which is arguably 
the first study devoted solely to the perceived abuses of debt buy-
ers.77 The report provided some of the earliest hard statistics on 
debt buyer behavior, finding that less than six percent of debt 
buyers were willing or able to demonstrate proper chain of title of 
the debt being pursued.78 
As of mid-2014, debt buyers have begun to receive serious 
regulatory scrutiny, with the CFPB’s adoption of a rule to extend 
its regulatory supervision to larger participants in the debt collec-
tion industry,79 and the Office of the Comptroller of the Curren-
cy’s publication of its suggested “best practices” in debt sales.80 
Congress is also taking up the question of debt collection re-
form.81 
                                                 
 76  Supra notes 33, 47 and 55. 
 77  ROBERT MARTIN ET AL., DIST. COUNCIL 37 MUN. EMPS. LEGAL 
SERVS., WHERE’S THE PROOF? (2009), available at 
http://www.dc37.net/benefits/health/pdf/MELS_proof.pdf. 
 78  Id. at 3 (noting that debt buyers responded to requests for the substan-
tiation of debts in only 5.5% of cases). 
 79  Defining Larger Participants of Certain Consumer Financial Product 
and Service Markets, 12 C.F.R. § 1090 (2012). See also Press Release, Consum-
er Fin. Prot. Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to Oversee Debt 
Collectors (Oct. 24, 2012), available at 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/consumer-financial-protection-
bureau-to-oversee-debt-collectors/. 
 80  Shining a Light on the Consumer Debt Industry: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Protection of the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. (July 17, 2013) (statement of the Of-
fice of the Comptroller of the Currency, Appendix 1). 
 81  A hearing led by Sen. Sherrod Brown was held on the question in a 
Senate subcommittee. Press Release, Sen. Sherrod Brown, Following Call to 
Rein In Debt Collection Industry, Brown Holds Hearing on Efforts to End 
Consumer Abuses (July 17, 2013), available at 
http://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/following-call-to-rein-
in-debt-collection-industry-brown-holds-hearing-on-efforts-to-end-consumer-
abuses (“Former bank employees have reported that they were instructed to 
‘[g]o ahead and sign’ affidavits verifying consumer debts, even when they 
didn’t have documentation . . . [w]hen debt buyers purchase these loans from 
the biggest banks, they sign ‘as is’ contracts, giving banks cover to offload 
debts for collection that may be inaccurate, incomplete, or legally uncollect-
able. . . Today I hope to hear from the FTC . . . and the CFPB about how we 
can modernize debt collection oversight to better serve consumers.”). Testimo-
ny at the hearing favored improvements in the provision of information in-
volved in debt collection. Statement of Corey Stone, supra note 50, at 3 
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In 2010, a coalition of legal aid and community develop-
ment organizations in New York City carried out one of the first 
studies of debt-buyer cases, titled Debt Deception: How Debt 
Buyers Abuse the Legal System to Prey on Lower-Income New 
Yorkers.82 The Debt Deception study used a sample of 365 court 
cases, of which 336 had reached a final judgment.83 The study 
found that 81% of the cases resulted in a default judgment, and 
94% of cases overall resulted in judgment for the debt buyer.84 
Not a single consumer in this study was represented by an attor-
ney, and not a single case in this study went to trial.85 The cases 
were filed against people who lived overwhelmingly in poor and 
minority neighborhoods.86 The study also noted that out of court 
settlements in court cases tended to be unsustainable payment 
plans, and that in the event of default, the debt buyer would be 
entitled to judgment in the full amount of the alleged debt.87 The 
report recommended increased regulation, increased judicial 
scrutiny, and increased legal representation.88 
A subsequent New York study published in 2013, Debt 
Collection Racket, provides insight into developments since the 
Debt Deception study.89 Using statistics from New York state 
courts and the U.S. Census, Debt Collection Racket suggests that 
while the overall rate of default judgments in New York state 
                                                                                                                 
(“[T]here is a surprising amount of consensus across all market participants – 
from debt collectors, creditors, and collection attorneys, to consumer advo-
cates, legal services providers and state attorneys general that we must develop 
clear standards for data integrity and record keeping in the debt collection 
market.”). See also Shining a Light on the Consumer Debt Industry: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Protection of the S. Comm. 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. (July 17, 2013) (state-
ment of Reilly Dolan, Acting Associate Director for the Division of Financial 
Practices at the Federal Trade Commission). 
 82  WILNER & SHEFTEL-GOMES, supra note 37. 
 83  Id. at 8. 
 84  Id. 
 85  Id. 
 86  Id. at 10-12. 
 87  Id. at 13. 
 88  Id. at 16-17. 
 89  SUSAN SHIN & CLAUDIA WILNER, NEW ECONOMY PROJECT, THE 
DEBT COLLECTION RACKET: HOW THE INDUSTRY VIOLATES DUE PROCESS 
AND PERPETUATES ECONOMIC INEQUALITY (Sarah Ludwig & Josh Zinner 
eds. 2013), available at 
http://www.nedap.org/resources/documents/DebtCollectionRacketNY.pdf. 
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may have fallen (by somewhere between 38% and 62% depend-
ing on location) between 2010 and 2013, the number of consumers 
represented by an attorney remains negligible at only 2%.90 
Through empirical analysis, the study also demonstrated racial 
and economic disparate impact.91 The areas most affected are 
“clustered in predominantly middle-income black communities.”92 
Mary Spector’s 2011 study reported on a detailed analysis 
of 507 cases filed in Dallas, Texas.93 The cases were drawn from 
the Dallas Court-at-Law, which is one of three courts with con-
current jurisdiction over such cases in Dallas.94 The Texas Study 
examined several of the same metrics which were examined in 
Debt Deception and which are examined in this study. Some of 
the findings from Texas differed from the findings of the Debt 
Deception study. Whereas Debt Deception showed a default rate 
of 81% in New York,95 In the Texas sample, only about 40% of 
cases resulted in default judgment.96 Further, the Texas study 
found that 50% were dismissed without prejudice.97 Finally, the 
Texas study showed that in 12% of cases, debt buyers were una-
ble to serve the defendant;98 in nearly 23% of served cases the de-
fendants appeared;99 and that defendants were represented by a 
lawyer in almost 10% of served cases.100 
Judith Fox’s 2012 study analyzed the activity of debt buy-
ers in Indiana through a sample of 645 cases.101 In Indiana, debt 
buyers often chose to avoid filing in small claims courts, even 
though they were well within the jurisdictional limit.102 Indiana, 
like Maryland, changed its rules to increase the documentary re-
quirements upon debt buyers filing collection cases, and this ap-
                                                 
 90  Id. at 5, 14. 
 91  Id. at 4. 
 92  Id. 
 93  Mary Spector, Debts, Defaults and Details: Exploring the Impact of 
Debt Collection Litigation on Consumers and the Courts, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 
257, 274-77 (2011). 
 94  Id. at 273. 
 95  WILNER & SHEFTEL-GOMES, supra note 37, at 8. 
 96  Spector, supra note 93, at 296. 
 97  Id. at 296. 
 98  Id. at 278. 
 99  Id. at 288. 
 100  Id. at 289. 
 101  See Fox, supra note 12. 
 102  Id. at 374-76. 
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peared to have temporarily suppressed filings.103 Indiana also had 
high rates of non-appearance, with 83% of defendants failing to 
respond and only 2.5% not served.104 Of those who responded to 
the complaint, most did not do so in the form required by court 
rules.105 Debt buyers obtained default judgment in 73% of cas-
es.106 As in the Debt Deception, none of the cases examined result-
ed in a trial.107 
One other study, somewhat different from the others, is 
important to the discussion.  In her 1992 study of Baltimore 
City’s rent court,108 Barbara Bezdek observed many of the same 
phenomena as were observed in this study: special accommoda-
tion of plaintiff’s representatives,109 high rates of default,110 and a 
general lack of evidentiary proof.111 
Unlike previous studies, this study examines a large num-
ber of online court dockets from a statewide sample in a unified 
system comprised of twenty-six different counties.  Maryland has 
a unified online trial court docket, and a search for any given par-
ty or attorney on the state courts’ official “Maryland Judiciary 
Case Search” website returns results for all trial courts in the 
state, regardless of geography or jurisdictional amount.112 Mary-
land Judiciary Case Search includes for each case the names of 
the parties, city, state, case number, trial date, and disposition.113 
                                                 
 103  Id. at 373. 
 104  Id. at 377. Note however that it was “assumed that service was per-
fected unless the file reflects otherwise.” Id. 
 105  Id. 
 106  Id. at 381. 
 107  Note that a small number of cases went to trial in Spector’s study: 
Spector, supra note 93, at 297, tbl.14 (discussing one case which resulted in a 
trial with judgment for the defendant, and showing the breakdown of out-
comes generally). 
 108  Barbara L. Bezdek, Silence in Court: Participation and Subordination 
of Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992). For 
a more recent examination of the plight of tenants, and continuing flaws in 
substantive and procedural law, see Mary Spector, Tenant Stories: Obstacles 
and Challenges Facing Tenants Today, 40 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 407 
(2007). 
 109  Id. at 551-53. 
 110  Nearly 70% of cases resulted in complete success for the plaintiff land-
lord. Id. at 554. 
 111  Id. at 562. 
 112  See Maryland Judiciary Case Search, MARYLAND COURTS, 
http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/inquiry/processDisclaimer.jis. 
 113  Id. 
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This study was limited to cases filed in the District Court, which 
has exclusive original jurisdiction for cases under $5,000, and 
concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Court for cases between 
$5,000 and $30,000.  All cases studied also included the names of 
any attorneys and law firms, the amount sought in the complaint, 
and the amount of any judgment, plus separate itemizations for 
any fees, costs or interest added to the judgment. Unlike the fed-
eral PACER system or other state systems, the Maryland website 
does not provide access to actual case documents. Those have to 
be retrieved from the courthouse in which they were filed, with 
the exception of older cases outside the scope of this study, which 
are sent to a central repository in the state’s capital. 
II.  THE STUDY 
A.  Methodology 
With the aid of two teaching assistants and the students 
enrolled in the Consumer Protection Clinic at the University of 
Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, we did a random 
sampling of 200 cases filed in 2009 and 200 cases filed in 2010 
(400 cases total), filed by each of 11 debt buyer plaintiffs, result-
ing in a total sample size of 4,400.114 The specific 11 debt buyers 
were selected because they constituted the highest volume filers 
in the state of Maryland.115 
                                                 
 114  The debt buyers selected were: Pasadena Receivables, Inc.; Midland 
Funding LLC (also known as Midland Credit Management); Arrow Financial 
Services, LLC; LVNV Funding, LLC; Asset Acceptance, LLC; Portfolio Re-
covery Associates; Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC; Advantage Assets II, INC; 
North Star Capital Acquisition; Fradkin & Weber, PA; Atlantic Credit & Fi-
nance, INC. A twelfth debt buyer, Equable Ascent Financial, LLC, also 
known as Hilco Receivables, was originally included in the list, but proved to 
have too few filings in 2009. 
 115  All had filed over 1,000 cases in the 2009-2010 period. This proved to 
be a practical approach to identifying significant debt buyers: the highest vol-
ume filer for the subject time period was Pasadena Receivables, Inc. which 
filed 24,435 cases during 2009-2010. During the years 2011-2013, consolidation 
occurred in the industry. In 2012 the largest volume filers in Maryland were 
Pasadena Receivables (and its new alter-ego, Maryland Portfolios), Midland 
Funding, and Portfolio Recovery Associates. Pasadena is local and privately 
held, while Midland Funding and Portfolio Recovery are publicly traded and 
national, Figures from the first half of 2013 suggest that Pasadena will behind 
Asset Acceptance this year. 
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The years 2009 and 2010 were selected because they were 
the most recent years that had a high percentage of case outcomes 
that had reached a final disposition of judgment or dismissal. In 
contrast, many cases filed during 2011 had not yet reached an 
outcome at the time the data were gathered.116 Finally, all cases 
studied were subject to the Maryland Affidavit Judgment Rules 
that existed prior to the implementation of new Rules on January 
1, 2012.117 While a companion study for cases filed after January 
1, 2012 might yield insight into the efficacy of the new rules, such 
a comprehensive analysis is beyond the scope of this article.118   
The data on each pre-selected debt buyer were gathered 
from Maryland Judiciary Case Search, pursuant to a protocol 
that insured that the cases were selected at random.119 Maryland 
Judiciary Case Search provides free access to a limited amount of 
information on cases filed in Maryland courts, including the dis-
trict courts which have exclusive original jurisdiction over “small 
claims” cases of under $5,000.00 (typically credit card or medical 
debt), and which consequently deal with almost all debt buyer 
cases in Maryland.120 The study data included information on fil-
ing and judgment dates, types of judgments, the amount of mon-
ey sought and awarded, and a breakdown of amounts awarded in 
addition to the initial claim (i.e., costs, interest, and attorneys’ 
fees). Most importantly, the data also included information about 
                                                 
 116  Examination of the data gathered has since shown that it takes a year 
or more from filing for some types of outcome to be reached. Had more recent 
cases been used, the results would have showed a distorted picture of the out-
comes, with a disproportionately high number of affidavit judgments: affidavit 
judgments took an average of less than 150 days, while default judgments took 
almost 340 days on average and dismissals for lack of prosecution under MD. 
R. 3-507 took over 400 days. 
 117 MD. R. 3-306. 
 118  We did analyze a small sample of 100 cases filed after January 1, 2012, 
and those results are reported in Section II.C. Based on this smaller sample, 
there does not appear to be any significant change in rates of default judg-
ments since the rules changes. 
 119  See Maryland Judiciary Case Search, supra note 112. 
 120  But see sources cited supra note 47, which suggest that the sale and en-
forcement of mortgage deficiency judgments is on the rise in Maryland and 
elsewhere. Case collection was limited to the District Courts because the Cir-
cuit Courts did not experience the same high volume of case filings. None of 
the 11 selected debt buyers filed more than 100 cases in the Circuit Court be-
tween 2009 and 2012. The volume of cases in Circuit Court was therefore in-
sufficient for a large-scale study of the kind possible using District Court cases. 
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service of process, representation of the parties and the filing of 
defenses.121 In addition, the data from this study were compared 
to the more limited data reported in the Maryland District 
Court’s internal statistics used for tracking purposes,122 as well as 
the official Maryland Judiciary Annual Statistics Report.123 
B.  Results 
1.  Amount Claimed in the Lawsuits Filed 
The amount claimed in a lawsuit is a significant metric, 
because it can determine jurisdictional questions, whether pretri-
al discovery will be allowed, whether a jury trial will be allowed, 
and whether all of the formal rules of evidence will apply at trial. 
In Maryland, lawsuits in which the principal amount sought is 
$5,000 or less (exclusive of costs, interest and attorneys’ fees) are 
treated as “small claims,” with less formality and fewer procedur-
al safeguards. More broadly, the amount claimed is a significant 
metric because it reflects the financial impact of debt collection 
suits on communities and on the economy. 
In the data sample of all 4,400 cases, 83% of the lawsuits 
claimed a principal amount of less than $5,000.00, thus qualifying 
them as “small claims.” This is significant because in practice, 
these “less than $5,000” cases get treated as “small claims” in 
which few or no rules of evidence are applied and in which few if 
any procedural safeguards are observed. Put another way, in only 
17% of the cases could a defendant even potentially have the 
right to the benefit of pretrial discovery, or of all the rules of evi-
dence. Further, to be eligible to demand and obtain a jury trial, 
the principal amount claimed in the lawsuit must be more than 
$15,000. 
The average amount of principal claimed was $2,993.73, 
according to the following distribution: 27% sought less than 
$1,000; 56% sought between $1,000 and $5,000, and 17% sought 
more than $5,000. The 17% of cases over the small claims limit 
                                                 
 121  The complete protocol is contained in Appendix A, infra. 
 122  District Court of Maryland Statistics, MARYLAND COURTS, 
http://www.courts.state.md.us/district/about.html#stats. 
 123  The official annual report is less useful than the internal statistics. See 
Annual Reports, MARYLAND COURTS, 
http://www.courts.state.md.us/publications/annualreports.html 
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were distributed in a narrowing tail, up to $30,000, as shown in 
Figure 1, below. 
Notably, the 17% of cases in which the amount claimed 
was over $5,000, thus entitling the defendant to pretrial discovery 
and the full range of the rules of evidence, did not experience sig-
nificantly different outcomes from the cases below $5,000 in 
which the defendant was not entitled to these added protections. 
This is not surprising when one considers that few consumers 
know their legal rights, let alone how to assert them. 
 
Figure 1 - Amounts Demanded 
 
The average principal amount sought in the total data 
sample of 4,400 cases was $2,993.17. Of the 2,006 cases that re-
sulted in judgment, the average amount sought in principal was 
$2,967.58. In these 2,006 cases where judgment was entered, debt 
buyers were awarded 94.7% of the principal claimed in the law-
suit ($2,811.66 out of $2,967.58). 
Although the average amount of the judgment principal 
was $2,811.66, the average total amount awarded (including any 
pre-judgment interest, costs and attorneys’ fees) was $3,323.76. In 
other words, assuming that the consumer actually borrowed the 
full $2,811.66 as principal (i.e. assuming it did not include any 
late fees, over limit fees or interest, which is almost never the 
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case), the data show that consumers got an average of $512.10 
(18.2%) tacked onto the judgment. The bulk of this amount was 
interest and attorneys’ fees. “Costs” (which presumably include a 
private process server’s fee) averaged only 11.6% ($59.75) of the 
additional $512.10. In terms of dollar value, prejudgment interest 
was the single largest amount added to a judgment. Prejudgment 
interest was added in 67% of the cases (1,347 out of 2,006) in 
which judgment was entered in favor of the debt buyer plaintiff. 
The average amount of prejudgment interest added in these 67% 
of cases won by the plaintiff was $476. This is a significant figure, 
in that it amounts to almost 10% of the jurisdictional amount of 
$5,000, when 83% of all cases were for an amount claimed of less 
than $5,000. Finally, in 561 cases an average of $474 was award-
ed for attorneys’ fees. The bottom line is that debt buyers ob-
tained judgment that was almost one fifth (18.2%) greater than 
the principal amount of the debt that they purchased for pennies 
on the dollar. 
Pre-judgment interest and attorneys’ fees are particularly 
significant because they should usually require proof greater than 
that required to prove a simple debt. If a plaintiff claims attor-
neys’ fees or pre-judgment interest at a contractual rate, the 
plaintiff must prove that such amounts are provided for in the 
underlying contract.124 Further, under the American Rule, attor-
neys’ fees may be awarded only pursuant to a statute or contract, 
and they should not be awarded to law firms which are them-
selves debt buyers, or are owned by debt-buyers, because Mary-
land prohibits attorneys who act in their own interests from 
charging attorneys’ fees.125 
                                                 
 124  MD. R. 3-306(d)(1). 
 125  See, e.g., Weiner v. Swales, 141 A.2d 749 (Md. 1958). The Financial 
Services division of the Attorney General’s office has successfully pursued at 
least one debt buyer for violation of this rule. Settlement Agreement & Consent 
Order at ¶11(b), Sunshine Financial Group, LLC, Nos. CFR-FY2012-019 & 
CFR-FY2011-135 (Md. Collection Agency Licensing Bd. Sept 9, 2011), availa-
ble at 
http://www.dllr.state.md.us/finance/consumers/pdf/sunshinesettlement.pdf 
(finding that Sunshine violated Maryland and Federal debt collection law by 
claiming attorney’s fees not permitted in law). Since the Sunshine case, other 
firms in similar positions have stopped seeking attorneys’ fees. Moreover, one 
of the compromises in the revised Rules was that, starting on January 1, 2012, 
a debt buyer who was seeking affidavit judgment at the time of filing the law-
suit need not produce the underlying contract if (1) it was not seeking pre-
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2.  How Consumers Respond to Debt Buyer Lawsuits 
Previous studies have found that the overwhelming ma-
jority of consumers do not formally defend collection suits against 
them.126 This study confirms that finding. Even when the figures 
were adjusted to remove those defendants who were not served 
with a complaint,127 eighty-five percent of all consumers failed to 
file a defense in writing (known in Maryland as a “Notice of In-
tention to Defend”). The lack of consumer engagement in debt 
collection cases is an ongoing problem that escapes resolution. At 
the June 2013 joint Federal Trade Commission/Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau workshop titled “The Life of a Debt” 
much was made of this problem, but no solutions were offered.128 
Figure 2 demonstrates that: (1) 85% of the 2,947 consum-
ers served with a complaint did not file a written response; (2) 
13% filed a response by themselves; and (3) 2% had a lawyer at 
the time of or after a response was filed. 
 
Figure 2 – How Consumers Respond to Suits 
 Everyone People Who were Served 
 N % N % 
Represented by 
Lawyer 52 1% 52 2% 
Responded 
Pro Se 397 9% 397 13% 
Did Not 
Respond 3951 90% 2498 85% 
Total 4400 100% 2947 100% 
 
The finding that only 2% of the people had a lawyer is 
consistent with the findings of other studies.129 On closer exami-
                                                                                                                 
judgment interest in excess of 6%; and (2) it was not seeking attorneys’ fees. 
The practical result has been that since January 1, 2012, debt buyers in Mary-
land always seek 6% prejudgment interest, and they never seek attorneys’ fees 
and they do not attach the underlying contract. See MD. R. 3-306. 
 126  See supra Part I.E. 
 127  Because the study relied on electronic court records, it was not possible 
to determine if actual service took place in all of these cases. Defective or “sew-
er” service may still be depressing the response rate of consumer defendants. 
 128  See Life of a Debt, supra note 32. 
 129  See supra Part I.E. 
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nation, the number of consumers actually defended in the lawsuit 
by a lawyer is likely to be even smaller: in 5 of the 52 cases where 
the defendant had a lawyer, the defendant declared bankruptcy. 
The attorney whose name appears on the record may therefore 
simply have been acting in relation to the bankruptcy, rather 
than actively defending the case. A Notice of Intention to Defend 
was filed in only one of these five cases, and in a different case the 
attorney appears to have assisted the defendant in challenging a 
post-judgment garnishment, but the lawyer did not defend the 
underlying lawsuit. 
3.  Bankruptcies 
Figure 3 shows bankruptcies filed by defendants and the 
amounts sought in the complaint. Defendants declared bankrupt-
cy in 261of 4,400 cases.130 An attorney appearance was filed in on-
ly 5 of these 261 cases. Consumers filed for bankruptcy even 
though no money judgment was entered in about 56% of the cas-
es, and in the remaining 44%, when a money judgment had been 
entered.131 With an average amount claimed of $4,450, bankrupt-
cy cases were significantly larger (almost 50% higher) than the 
average of $2,993.73 claimed overall.132 
 
Figure 3 – Bankruptcies Observed 






Pre Judgment 147 56% $ 680,988.84 $ 4,632.58 
Notice Filed 
Post Judgment 114 44% $ 480,680.88 $ 4,216.50 
Total 261 100% $ 1,161,669.72 $ 4,450.84 
                                                 
 130  Case Search records Bankruptcy as a case status rather than as a case 
outcome – therefore bankruptcies out of the total sample, rather than cases 
with a final outcome. 
 131  The distinction of presence vs. absence of a money judgment was made 
because the actual dates of the bankruptcy filing were not a part of the data 
which gathered pursuant to the protocol. 
 132  See infra Figure 3. 
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4.  Unrepresented Consumers Fare Poorly 
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that 925 of 
the 4,400 cases sampled were dismissed when the defendant was 
never served. In 702 of these cases, the court record reflects that 
the dismissal was due to lack of prosecution or lack of jurisdic-
tion. In other words, according to the data sample, 24% of all cas-
es filed were never served.  While no firm conclusions can be 
drawn from the fact that 24% of cases were never served, three 
possibilities seem likely: (1) a large number of defendants settled 
prior to the law suit getting served, which obviated the need for 
service;  (2) debt buyer documentation is so stale that they cannot 
obtain accurate current location information on defendants; or (3) 
the debt buyer business model is structured such that it is not 
profitable to invest resources into locating current addresses for 
defendants. 
Of the 2,947 cases that were served and reached final out-
come, 2,498 people (85% of the total) did not file a response; 397 
people (13%) filed a pro se response; and 52 people (2%) had a 
lawyer who entered an appearance in the case. 
          Of the 2,947 cases that were served and reached final out-
come, 2,006 (68%) resulted in a money judgment against the de-
fendant, in an average amount of $3,323.76. Yet, only 9 (0.4%) of 
the judgments were the result of a trial. Outcomes varied depend-
ing on whether the person (1) filed no response; (2) filed a re-
sponse; or (3) had a lawyer who entered an appearance in the 
case. 
Defendants who filed no response had the worst outcomes. 
Of the 85% of people who did not file a response, debt buyers ob-
tained a judgment by affidavit, consent, default, or trial 73% of 
the time, and recovered 82% of the amount sought in the com-
plaints. 
Defendants who filed a response had better outcomes than 
those who did not file a response, but the outcomes were poor 
overall. Of the 13% of defendants who proceeded pro se (by filing 
a response called a Notice of Intention to Defend), debt buyers 
obtained judgment by affidavit, consent, default, or trial 47% of 
the time, and recovered 62% of the amount sought in the com-
plaints. 
Defendants who had a lawyer fared best. Of the 2% of de-
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fendants who had a lawyer enter an appearance in the case, debt 
buyers obtained an affidavit, consent, or default judgment only 
15% of the time, and recovered only 21% of the principal amount 
sought in the complaints.133 However defendants were represent-
ed by a lawyer in only 52 cases, and it is clear that different law-
yers provided different levels of service, rendering this data not 
statistically significant enough to be a reliable measurement. 
Nevertheless, data from outside of this study confirms what is 
widely believed: lawyers make a difference. A 2013 unpublished 
study of the Maryland’s Pro Bono Resource Committee’s Con-
sumer Protection Project found that of 80 cases in which pro bo-
no attorneys represented defendants in collection suits by debt 
buyers, debt buyers obtained final money judgments in only 12 
cases (15%). Overwhelmingly, defendants with an attorney suc-
ceeded in having the case dismissed.134 
 
Figure 4 - Outcomes by Representation 
 
No Notice to 
Defend Filed Notice Filed Attorney 
Outcome n % n % n % 
Money Judgment 1812 73% 186 47% 8 15% 
% of Total Complaint 
Amounts awarded  82%  62%  21% 
 
  
                                                 
 133  The fact that there were affidavit and default judgments when there 
was an attorney of record suggests that the attorney involvement commenced 
only after judgment was entered, but the data is not conclusive. 
 134  Study on file with the author. 
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Filed Attorney Total 
Outcome n % n % n % n % 
Affidavit 
Judgment135 1518 61% 96 24% 6 12% 1620 55% 
Consent 
Judgment for 
P136 231 9% 61 15% 2 4% 294 10% 
Default 
Judgment for 
P137 61 2% 22 6% 0 0% 83 3% 
Dismissed 
by Court 149 6% 66 17% 11 21% 226 8% 
Rule 3-506 
Dismissal138 293 12% 69 17% 17 33% 379 13% 
                                                 
 135  See MD. R. 3-306. To seek affidavit judgment the plaintiff must de-
mand it and file an affidavit to support it at the time of filing the complaint. 
MD. R. 3-506(b). If the defendant fails to file a Notice of Intention to Defend 
(“NOID”), the court may grant judgment without a trial, provided the affidavit 
is sufficient. MD. R. 3-306(e)(2)(A). When the defendant files a NOID, but fails 
to appear at trial, it appears that some clerks record the resulting judgment as 
an affidavit judgment, hence the presence of 96 affidavit judgments among de-
fendants who filed NOIDs. 
 136  A consent judgment may be entered at any time. MD. R. 3-612. How-
ever, consent judgments may represent enforcement of the terms of settle-
ments, allowed by Rule 3-506(b). 
 137  A default judgment may be entered in two situations: where affidavit 
judgment is denied, but on the trial date the defendant fails to appear; where a 
NOID is filed but the defendant fails to appear. MD. R. 3-509. One anomalous 
default judgment was entered where the plaintiff failed to appear at a hearing. 
 138  A form of voluntary dismissal where the plaintiff can dismiss without 
the court’s permission provided no counterclaim has been made, and notice is 
given to the parties and the court. MD. R. 3-506(a).  The analysis of the specific 
reason or reasons that cases were dismissed is limited, because the data in Case 
Search often does not specify whether the dismissal was due to a voluntary set-
tlement (pursuant to Rule 3-506(b)) or to any other of several factors listed in 
Rule 3-506, or even factors which are not listed in Rule 3-506. One such factor 
may be that debt buyers have been known to settle or dismiss as soon as they 
become aware that a case might be contested. Similarly, collection phone calls 
and letters do not stop just because a lawsuit was filed. In fact, it seems axio-
matic that people who are served with a lawsuit are more likely to make a set-
tlement than those who have not. This is another area that warrants study, but 
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terms139 164 7% 58 15% 7 13% 229 8% 
Rule 3-507 
Dismissal140 78 3% 14 4% 2 4% 94 3% 
Trial  
Judgment for 
P 2 0% 7 2% 0 0% 9 0% 
Trial  
Judgment for 
D 2 0% 3 1% 7 13% 12 0% 
Default 
Judgment for 
D 0 0% 1 0% 0 0% 1 0% 
Total 2498 100% 397 100% 52 100% 2947 100% 
5.  Settlement 
Settlements between debt buyers and unrepresented de-
fendants141 are fairly common. Of the 2,498 people who were 
served and did not file a Notice of Intention to Defend, 395 (16%) 
settled. Some of these settlements (164, 42%) were recorded as 
Rule 3-506(b) dismissals, so their terms are unknown. The re-
maining 231 (58%) were consent judgments, the terms of which 
are known. Most of consent judgments (183, or 79%) were for the 
amount demanded in the complaint. The forty-eight defendants 
(21%) who settled for a reduced amount achieved an average re-
duction of 19%. However, outcomes were not evenly distributed: 
                                                                                                                 
which is beyond the scope of this article. 
 139  A dismissal based upon a settlement. The case may be reinstated in or-
der to “enforce the stipulated terms.” MD. R. 3-506(b). A dismissal on stipulat-
ed terms may therefore become a consent judgment if the terms are not kept. 
 140  A lawsuit is subject to dismissal by the court if the complaint has not 
been served for more than a year, or if there have been no docket entries for 
one year. MD. R. 3-507. 
 141  In this context, “unrepresented” is used to designate those people who 
did not have a lawyer, and who did not file a Notice of Intention to Defend.  
“Self-represented” is used to designate people who did not have a lawyer, but 
who did file a Notice of Intent to Defend. 
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twenty-two (10%) achieved a reduction of less than 10%, while 
four achieved reductions of over 50%. These results suggest that 
even the few defendants who do settle their cases with plaintiffs 
do not usually benefit much from the resulting settlement. A very 
small group was successful in achieving a significant reduction in 
the alleged debt, but most are no better off than if they had simp-
ly waited for affidavit judgment. 
Self-represented defendants (i.e. those who filed a Notice 
of Intent to Defend) fared little better. More of them settled: 119 
out of 397 (30%) as opposed to 16% of the unrepresented. Of 
these settlements, sixty-one (51%) were consent judgments. Most 
of these consent judgments (forty-three, 69%) were for the same 
amount as the complaint. Where the judgment was for less than 
the amount in the complaint, it was reduced by an average of 
23%. Again, however, only a small number of defendants benefit-
ted the most, as shown in Figure 6, below. 
 
Figure 6 - Consent Judgments142 
6.  Trends in Debt buyer Activity 
In addition to the cases from 2009 and 2010 which are 
studied above in detail, the total number of lawsuits filed in Mar-
yland by the subject debt buyers was calculated for the period 
                                                 
 142  Here, “No NOID” denotes people who were unrepresented (i.e. the 
people who did not have a lawyer and who did not file a Notice of Intent to 
Defend).  “NOID” represents people who did not have a lawyer, but who did 
file a Notice of Intent to Defend. 
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from January 1, 2011 through December 31, 2013. In Maryland, 
debt buyers filed more than 37,000 cases in 2011, more than 
22,000 cases in 2012, and more than 24,000 cases in 2013.143  
Thus, as calculated in Figure 7, the total number of filings in 
Maryland by the subject debt buyers during each year from 2009 
through 2013 was as follows: 40,796 in 2009; 43,581 in 2010; 
37,202 in 2011; 22,566 in 2012; and 24,317 in 2013.  It is clear that 
filings hit their peak in 2010, their low point in 2012, and perhaps 
began to rebound in 2013.  It is unclear – and worthy of further 
study to determine - whether the dramatic decline in filings is due 
to market forces, to regulatory action, to the 2012 changes to the 
Maryland Rules, or some other factor or combination of factors.  




                                                 
 143  There is an additional group of debt buyers who were either nonexist-
ent or not as active in 2009-2010 as they were after that time frame. Adding 
the gross number of filings of this new group raises the total filings in 2011 to 
37,202; in 2012 to 22,566; and in 2013 to 24,317. This new group consists of the 
following entities: Credit Acceptance, Osiris Holdings, Unifund CCR, Razor 
Capital, and Maryland Portfolios. 
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Figure 7 – Number of Cases & Market Share of Debt Buyers, 
2009-2012 
Debt Buyer 
Years     
2009 % 2010 % 2011 % 2012 % 2013 % Totals 
Advantage Assets, II, INC 462 1% 1685 4% 144 0% 0 0% 1 0% 2291 
Arrow Financial Services, 
LLC 5376 13% 2321 5% 75 0% 1 0% 1 0% 7773 
Asset Acceptance, LLC 2978 7% 3770 9% 1154 3% 492 2% 2208 9% 8394 
Atlantic Credit & Finance, 
INC 1712 4% 979 2% 97 0% 2 0% 14 0% 2790 
CACH 2701 7% 2146 5% 817 2% 210 1% 1093 4% 5874 
Cavalry Portfolio Services, 
LLC 990 2% 1223 3% 1791 5% 354 2% 1602 7% 4358 
Commercion 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 45 0% 1 0% 45 
Credit Acceptance 824 2% 1013 2% 3234 9% 1399 6% 1531 6% 6470 
Equable Ascent 50 0% 1612 4% 3539 10% 250 1% 145 1% 5451 
Fortis Capital 57 0% 38 0% 31 0% 0 0% 0 0% 126 
Fradkin & Weber, PA 249 1% 3748 9% 102 0% 20 0% 3 0% 4119 
LVNV Funding, LLC 2756 7% 4445 10% 5205 14% 0 0% 5 0% 12406 
Midland Funding, LLC 5546 14% 4839 11% 14242 38% 10786 48% 9619 40% 35413 
North Star Capital  
Acquisition 1155 3% 540 1% 64 0% 1 0% 1 0% 1760 
Osiris Holdings 0 0% 84 0% 404 1% 31 0% 208 1% 519 
Palisades Collection LLC 345 1% 520 1% 101 0% 21 0% 9 0% 987 
Pasadena Receivables, INC 13570 33% 10865 25% 3688 10% 2122 9% 1085 4% 30245 
Portfolio Recovery Associates 1608 4% 2651 6% 2189 6% 6328 28% 6608 27% 12776 
Razor 0 0% 128 0% 40 0% 314 1% 103 0% 482 
Sherman 20 0% 0 0% 0 0% 4 0% 0 0% 24 
Sunshine Financial Group, 
LLC 36 0% 822 2% 231 1% 4 0% 0 0% 1093 
Unifund 361 1% 152 0% 54 0% 182 1% 80 0% 749 
            
TOTALS 40796  43581  37202  22566  24317  168,462 
            
MONTHLY AVERAGE 3399.67  3631.75  3100.17  1880.50  2026.42   
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Figure 8 - Total Debt Buyer Filings in Maryland District Courts, 
Jan. 1, 2009 to December 31, 2013 
 
Polls by InsideARM, a debt-collection trade publication, 
show that despite the overall trend that Figure 8 appears to show, 
the purchase and sale of junk debt is a continuing feature of the 
debt collection industry.144 Given the number of private class ac-
tions and public enforcement actions by the state of Maryland 
against prominent debt buyers in Maryland, the decline in the 
volume of lawsuits may also reflect a decision to increase collec-
tions through non-litigation means such as letters and phone 
calls.145 There are, however, no signs that the debt buying indus-
try is disappearing or that the problems identified by the Rules 
Committee have been solved. The filing of tens of thousands of 
debt buyer lawsuits continues to be a significant load on Mary-
land’s courts and consumers. 
                                                 
 144  In Summer 2011, the last period for which InsideARM has published 
figures, 37.2% of original creditors were increasing their use of debt collection 
agencies or debt buyers while 22.9% were maintaining the same level of usage. 
The ARM Barometer: Creditor Results, INSIDEARM.COM, (Summer 2011), 
http://www.insidearm.com/features/arm-barometer/summer-2011/creditor-
results/. Most debt buyers reported an increase in activity in the same period: 
42.9% moderate, 14.3% large. The ARM Barometer: Debt Buyer Results, In-
sideARM.com, (Summer 2011), http://www.insidearm.com/features/arm-
barometer/summer-2011/results-debt-buyers/. 
 145  While the shift from litigation to non-litigation based collection would 
be an interesting subject for further study, it is a difficult area to research em-
pirically, because non-litigation based collection does not leave the same type 
of broad paper trail in the public records. 
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While some debt buyers have stopped filing collection cas-
es in Maryland, others have increased their filings. Encore Capi-
tal Group (parent of Midland Funding, LLC) purchased Asset 
Acceptance, Inc. in mid-2013, leaving only three major players in 
Maryland, where there were once more than ten.146  
7.  Geographic Concentration of Cases 
Debt buyers sued disproportionately in jurisdictions with 
larger concentrations of poor people and racial minorities. For 
example, Prince George’s County has only 15% of the Maryland’s 
population, yet 23% of all debt buyer complaints were filed 
against Prince George’s County residents.147 A disparity also ex-
ists in Baltimore City, as illustrated in the Figure 9 below.  
 
Figure 9 – Cases and Population in Top Six Jurisdiction 
 
As Figure 9 shows, based on filing rates and population esti-
mates for 2010,148 Prince George’s County and Baltimore City have a 
greater proportion of debt buyer cases than that of the general popula-
tion.  In contrast, Baltimore, Montgomery and Anne Arundel Coun-
                                                 
 146  See supra Figure 7, showing the market share of various debt buyers in 
Maryland. 
 147  See infra Figure 9. 
 148  Population figures from the 2010 United States Census, complied by 
the Maryland Department of Planning. MD. DEPT. PLANNING, 2000-2010 
INTERCENSAL ESTIMATES BY GENDER, RACE & ORIGIN (2012) [hereinafter 
INTERCENSAL ESTIMATES], available at 
http://www.mdp.state.md.us/msdc/IntercensalEst00_10/MDEst_2000to2010_b
yRace&Origin.xls. 
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ties have fewer cases based on population, while Harford seems to be 
evenly balanced. 
The differences between these areas can be better shown 
by comparing some of their basic demographics. As Figure 10 
shows, there is no straightforward connection between either me-
dian income or race, and disparities in the filing rate in these ju-
risdictions. Baltimore City households have nearly half the medi-
an income of Maryland, and Baltimore City is a “majority-
minority” jurisdiction, but its case-to-population disparity is only 
2% (i.e. Baltimore City’s share of cases was 2% more than its 
share of Maryland’s population). Prince George’s County has a 
nonwhite population 5% higher than Baltimore City, and slightly 
above average income, but its case-to-population disparity is 8%.  
Baltimore County, with a slightly lower than median income and 
a slightly higher nonwhite population fared similarly to Anne Ar-
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Figure 10 – Comparison of High Filing Jurisdictions 
 
However, the general trends in this comparison suggest 
that race and wealth make a difference: the counties with the 
fewest proportionate share of lawsuits are richer and less diverse 
                                                 
 149  Median Income figures are from the American Communities Survey 
(ACS), 3 year estimates for 2009-2011. MD. DEPT. PLANNING, MEDIAN 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN MARYLAND’S JURISDICTIONS (THREE YEAR ACS 
DATA) 2009-2011, available at 
http://www.mdp.state.md.us/msdc/HH_Income/ACS_3yr_Household_Median
_Income_2011.xls. Disparity figures are the percentage deviation from the me-
dian income for Maryland. 
 150  From the 2010 United States Census, complied by the Maryland De-
partment of Planning. INTERCENSAL ESTIMATES, supra note 148. 
 151  Id. 
 152  “Disparity” represents the difference between each jurisdiction’s pro-
portion of Maryland’s population and that jurisdiction’s proportion of the 
sampled cases. For example, Prince George’s County has 15% of the Mary-
land’s population but had 23% of the sampled cases, so the disparity between 
cases and population is 8%: Prince George’s County had 8% more cases than 
the size of its population indicates it should. 
 Median Income149 Race150 Population 
County Income 
Difference 






% People151 Cases Disparity152 
Prince 
George’s 
County $72,178 1% 74% 35% 863420 1020 8% 
Baltimore 
County $64,814 -9% 34% -5% 805029 569 -1% 
Baltimore 
City $39,561 -45% 69% 30% 620961 565 2% 
Montgomery 
County $94,358 32% 36% -3% 971777 580 -4% 
Anne  
Arundel 
County $84,409 18% 22% -16% 537656 347 -1% 
Harford 
County $78,648 10% 18% -21% 244826 186 0% 
        
Maryland $71,294 — 39% — 5773552 4400 — 
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than Maryland as a whole. 
An analysis based on zip codes or census tracts would en-
able a more detailed comparison of case data with census data. 
Alternatively, further study specifically dedicated to the disparate 
impact of debt collection suits would go a long way towards de-
termining whether debt-buyer suits disproportionately affect par-
ticular groups. 
C.  Follow-Up 
As noted above, the rules governing affidavit judgments in 
Maryland changed on January 1, 2012.153 In order to explore the 
immediate effects of these changes, a sample size of 100 cases 
filed after January 1, 2012, was analyzed using the same protocol 
as for the original study.154 
Of the 100 follow-up cases gathered, 83 resulted in a final 
outcome, of which 55 (66%) were judgments against the Defend-
ant. Analysis of this limited sample suggests limited changes fol-
lowing the introduction of the new rules.  
First, the new sample had a larger dollar value on aver-
age, while the amount of the judgment was smaller on average. 
Specifically, while the original sample had an average complaint 
amount of $2,993, in the follow-up it was $3,248. In the original 
sample, the average total judgment was $3,323, but in the follow-
up it was $2,594. Part of this change may be accounted for by a 
substantial drop in awards of interest and attorneys’ fees, which 
is a direct result of the new Rule 3-306. Pre-judgment interest was 
awarded in 67% of judgments in the original sample, but only 
25% in the follow up sample, while awards of attorneys’ fees 
dropped from 28% in the original sample to 13% in the follow-up 
sample. 
Second, the follow-up shows an increase in the proportion 
of affidavit judgments, from 55% of served cases with outcomes 
from the original sample, to 63% of similar cases in the follow up 
                                                 
 153  See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 154  Due to the consolidation that has occurred in the industry, only 5 of the 
original debt buyers had sufficient numerous filings to sample in 2012: Pasa-
dena Receivables, Midland Funding, Cavalry Portfolio, Asset Acceptance and 
Portfolio Recovery Associates. The cutoff date for gathering data for this sam-
ple was November 15, 2013. 
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sample.155 This is somewhat puzzling, given the increased re-
quirements of the new rules. It is possible that the result is an ar-
tifact of other changes and not a real increase in the frequency of 
default judgments. Likewise, it could mean that the cases filed 
under the new rules are of a better quality.  The increase corre-
sponded with a drop in Rule 3-507 dismissals. The proportion of 
cases “active” was also higher in the follow-up than in the original 
sample. This suggests that some cases in the follow-up will be 
dismissed eventually. At the time of sampling, there were simply 
too many possible influences on the affidavit judgments to draw 
firm conclusions regarding the impact of the new rules. 
Third, more defendants defended themselves in the fol-
low-up: 24% of defendants who were served filed a Notice of In-
tention to Defend in the follow-up, compared with only 15% in 
the original sample. It is, however, difficult to relate this devel-
opment to the new affidavit judgment rule.  The increased filings 
of Notices of Intent to Defend may be a result of generally in-
creased awareness about the flaws of debt buyer lawsuits, or the 
fact that there is now a formal pro bono legal assistance program 
in effect to defend debt buyer lawsuits, or due to other factors.  
Finally, several metrics showed no significant change in 
the follow-up: the rate of service, geographical distribution of 
cases, attorney representation156 and proportion of bankruptcy fil-
ings.  
                                                 
 155  The proportion of cases served was the same in both samples: 76%. 
 156  Because representation is so rare, as shown by the original sample, a 
larger follow-up would be required to state with any certainty that attorney 
representation was unchanged.  In addition to the nascent emergence of a for-
mal pro bono representation program in debt buyer cases, the District Court in 
partnership with the Maryland Legal Aid Bureau has also created and rapidly 
expanded a “Self-Help Center” that has provided assistance to literally tens of 
thousands of pro se litigants, many of whom are defending debt buyer law-
suits.  A 2012 University of Maryland study of the Self-Help Center concluded 
that “There was also evidence, drawn from analyses of case event data ob-
tained from the Judiciary’s management information system, suggesting that 
cases involving clients of the Center, when compared with cases involving self-
represented litigants who did not receive Center services, showed greater un-
derstanding and engagement of litigants about the case, and improved chances 
for judgments being based on merits and rights, rather than default.” Evalua-
tion of the Glen Burnie District Court Self-Help Center, UNIV. OF MD. INST. 
FOR GOVERNMENTAL SERV. AND RESEARCH, 
http://www.igsr.umd.edu/applied_research/displaymedia.php?mediaID=26 
(last updated Feb. 18, 2014). 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
The following three sections contain an analysis of the 
findings described in Part II. Section A describes the implications 
for providing legal assistance or representation to consumers sued 
by debt buyers. Section B compares the findings of this study 
with those of four other studies.  
A.  The Importance of Representation 
Figure 5 shows that consumers sued by a debt buyer have 
the worst outcomes when they do nothing and the best outcomes 
when they are represented by an attorney. When consumers did 
nothing, the cases against them were dismissed about 20% of the 
time. In contrast, the less than 2% of defendants who had a law-
yer achieved a dismissal rate of about 70%. 
Although Maryland has over 30,000 lawyers (22,500 of 
whom are in private practice),157 in 2009-2010, only thirty-eight 
attorneys represented consumers in a total of fifty-two of the 
4,400 cases sampled. 
Extensive state funding for the representation of such de-
fendants is unlikely under current budgetary conditions. Avenues 
for improving representation and access to justice have been ex-
plored by the Maryland Access to Justice Commission including 
fee shifting,158 the implementation of a right to counsel in civil 
cases,159 and unbundled legal assistance for self-represented liti-
gants.160 
A recent study by James Greiner and Cassandra Patta-
                                                 
 157  The ABA estimates 23,000 lawyers were practicing in Maryland as of 
2013, and about 75% of these were in private practice. MKT. RESEARCH 




 158  Md. Access to Justice Comm’n, Fee Shifting to Promote the Public In-
terest in Maryland, 42 U. BALT. L.F. 38 (2011). The Commission’s proposals 
focused on one-way fee shifting to support plaintiffs in civil rights and similar 
cases, however, the resulting bill was unsuccessful in the legislature. MD. 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2012, 9-10 (2012) [hereinafter 
MD. ACCESS TO JUSTICE REPORT], available at 
http://www.courts.state.md.us/mdatjc/pdfs/annualreport2012.pdf. 
 159  MD. ACCESS TO JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 158, at 10. 
 160  Id. at 1-4. 
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nayak examines the impact of representing people pro bono.161 
Although it was not the main purpose of this study to explore this 
question, some of the results of this study are relevant to that de-
bate. The proceedings of the District Courts of Maryland are very 
different from the subject-specific proceedings that the Greiner 
study examined, and as the authors noted, the nature of both the 
subject matter and the forum may mean that their results are not 
generally applicable.162 Reflecting on that study, Jeff Selbin and 
several colleagues have suggested that more attention should be 
paid to where and at what point in the process limited legal assis-
tance resources should be tapped.163 The instant study clearly 
shows that consumer defendants had better outcomes when a 
lawyer appeared in their case. However, the primary purpose of 
this study is not to demonstrate the value of representation, but 
rather to demonstrate what occurs in its absence. 
As noted in Part II.B.5 above, the data regarding settle-
ments suggests that in many cases, defendants who settle are as 
badly off as those who are subjected to judgments. The problem 
of settlements arose at the FTC/CFPB roundtable on “The Life 
Cycle Of A Debt.” Thomas Lawrie, a Maryland Assistant Attor-
ney General made the point that contact between debt-collecting 
attorneys and unrepresented defendants provides collecting at-
torneys with an opportunity to push defendants to settle on terms 
they do not understand and cannot afford.164 Unsustainable set-
                                                 
 161  D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evalu-
ation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Ac-
tual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118 (2012). 
 162  Greiner and Pattanayak used the Harvard Legal Aid Bureau’s work in 
unemployment insurance cases. In explaining their results, the authors thought 
that self-representation may have been easier in this particular type of case, 
and that the administrative law judges hearing the cases may have compen-
sated for the disadvantages of self-representation. Id. at 2150-51. 
 163  Jeffrey Selbin, Jeanne Charn, Anthony Alfieri & Stephen Wizner, Ser-
vice Delivery, Resource Allocation, and Access to Justice: Greiner and Patta-
nayak and the Research Imperative, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 45 (2012), 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/1099.pdf. A study addressing this 
question is currently under way led by Dalié Jiménez and James Greiner. Dalié 
Jiménez, D. James Greiner, Lois R. Lupica & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Improving 
the Lives of Individuals in Financial Distress Using a Randomized Control 
Trial: A Research and Clinical Approach, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 
449 (2013). 
 164  Patrick Lunsford, ARM Data Exchange Standards Focus of 
FTC/CFPB Collection Roundtable, INSIDEARM.COM, (June 7, 2013), 
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tlements are likely to merely delay, rather than prevent, judg-
ments. Further study would be required to determine exactly 
what terms defendants in these cases generally receive, whether 
they understand the terms of their settlements, and whether they 
are in fact able to fulfill those terms. One obvious solution would 
be to have a standard form settlement agreement that is realistic 
and fair, and which provides that an alleged breach of the agree-
ment should be met with a motion to enforce the terms of the set-
tlement, rather than a default judgment in the full amount sued 
for. 
B.  Comparison with Other Studies 
Figure 11, below, sets out three key metrics gathered in 
this and previous studies of debt buyer cases: (1) the percentage of 
defendants who did not respond to the debt collection complaint; 
(2) the percentage of defendants who were represented; and (3) 
the percentage of cases which resulted in judgments against de-
fendants, together with the sample size and years in which the 
data were gathered. 
The results show some clear trends, but also large dispari-
ties. Some of these disparities can be explained by methodological 
differences between the studies. However, some disparities can 
only be explained as real differences in the lawsuits studied. 
These differences might arise because of the circumstances at the 
time of each study, differences between the geographical areas 




                                                                                                                 
http://www.insidearm.com/daily/debt-buying-topics/debt-buying/arm-data-
exchange-standards-focus-of-ftccfpb-collection-roundtable/. 
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Figure 11 – Comparison of Key Results 
 
Defendant 









This Study 85% < 2% 73%165 4400166 2009-2010 
Spector 
Study167 77% 10% 44% 507 2007 
Fox Study168 83% 4% 81%169 645 2009 
Debt  
Deception 




Study171 94%-82% 2% 38-62%172 168,807 2011 
Consumers in  
Trouble173 70-98% 11-30% 91-92% 1504 1967 
Bezdek  
Study174 85% 0.18%-2.8% — 659 1991 
                                                 
 165  This number is the sum of affidavit, default, consent and trial judg-
ments,. See supra Figure 5. 
 166  As mentioned earlier, out of the 4,400 case sample, only 2,947 (76%) in-
volved cases where the complaint was served on the defendant, and the case 
reached final disposition. 
 167  Spector, supra note 93, at 288-289, 296. 
 168  Fox, supra note 12, at 377, 381. Fox’s figures do not account for de-
fendants who were not served, so the true rate of default is higher. In addition, 
Fox’s figure of 83% for non-response is that for total non-response. Many of 
the responses were technically inadequate and may have been rejected by the 
Court. 
 169 This figure is the aggregate of default, summary and consent judg-
ments. Id. at 377. 
 170  WILNER & SHEFTEL-GOMES, supra note 37, at 8. The study did not 
provide a figure for failure to respond complaints and observed no represented 
defendants. 
 171  SHIN & WILNER, supra note 89, at 5-6. Note that these statistics varied 
by jurisdiction. The sample included basic information from all civil collection 
suits filed in New York. Id. 
 172  These figures represent the range of default judgment percentage 
across New York jurisdictions. No figure is available in this study for non-
default judgments. 
 173  CAPLOVITZ, supra note 23, at 215, 221-223. The ranges given are the 
ranges observed as between the cities in which court actions were studied: 
New York, Detroit and Chicago. 
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The clearest trend, repeatedly highlighted in the literature, 
is that defendants often do not respond to collection suits.175 This 
has been recognized by industry and consumer advocacy at least 
since the FTC’s roundtable discussions, leading to its Broken 
System report.176 The evidence suggests that the rate of default is 
approximately 80-90%.177 Comparison with the Baltimore rent 
court study shows that failure to appear extends beyond consum-
er credit collection cases to rent cases. More recent figures from 
elsewhere in the country suggest that tenant defendants fail to 
appear just as often as the debt buyer defendants in this study.178 
This is significant because of the high stakes involved in rent cas-
es, in which tenants stand to lose, literally, the roof over their 
heads.  Despite the increased stakes, it appears that rent court de-
fendants are no more likely to defend themselves in court than 
the people who are sued by debt buyers. This suggests that coerc-
ing defendants to attend and participate in court by “raising the 
stakes” (for example, through the creditor’s contempt discussed 
by Shepard) is not effective. 
                                                                                                                 
 174  Bezdek, supra note 108. This study is unlike the others because it con-
cerns actions based on rent and some of the figures are not directly compara-
ble. The range given for representation represents two figures—0.18% is the 
representation rate based on court files and 2.8% the rate at which defendants 
reported receiving legal advice. Id. at 556, n.79. 
 175  A lack of debtor participation came to be a central theme of the “Life of 
A Debt” roundtable held by CFPB and FTC in June 2013. Lunsford, supra 
note 164. 
 176 BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 7, n.18 (“There was a broad consen-
sus among roundtable panelists that relatively few consumers who are sued for 
alleged unpaid debts actually participate in the lawsuits… panelists from 
throughout the country estimated that sixty percent to ninety five percent of 
consumers debt collection lawsuits result in defaults, with most panelists indi-
cating that the rate in their jurisdiction was close to 90%.”). 
 177  See supra Figure 11. 
 178  See, e.g., WILLIAM E. MORRIS INST. FOR JUSTICE, INJUSTICE IN NO 
TIME: THE EXPERIENCE OF TENANTS IN MARICOPA COUNTY JUSTICE 
COURTS 2 (2005), available at 
http://morrisinstituteforjustice.org/docs/254961Finalevictionreport-
P063.06.05.pdf (less than 20% of defendant-tenants appeared); KAREN DORAN, 
JOHN GUZZARDO, KEVIN HILL, NEAL KITTERLIN, WENGFENG LI & RYAN 
LIEBL, LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR BETTER HOUS., NO TIME FOR JUSTICE: A 
STUDY OF CHICAGO’S EVICTION COURT 4 (2003) (56% of defendant tenants 
appeared), available at http://lcbh.org/images/2008/10/chicago-eviction-court-
study.pdf. That these rates differ widely suggests that just because the case is 
high stakes for the individual they are not necessarily more likely to participate 
in the case than in lower stakes cases. 
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Lack of legal representation is another clear trend. Rates 
of attorney representation of defendants in debt buyer cases vary 
from 0% to 10%. Although representation rates are uniformly 
low, the variation between studies is extremely high: the Spector 
study suggests that five times as many defendants are represented 
in these cases in Texas as compared to Maryland or New York.179 
Again, Spector’s figures may represent a difference in forum or 
economic conditions. 
While the rate at which consumers do not respond to the 
lawsuit is uniformly high, actual rates of default judgment varied 
widely, from 38% to 81%, across all jurisdictions and studies. The 
New York studies accounted for both the highest and the lowest 
rate, depending on jurisdiction and date.180 Various results across 
jurisdictions may reflect socioeconomic differences. As both New 
York studies observe, and as has been true at least since the 
1970s, debt collection is concentrated in poor areas, and falls dis-
proportionately on minorities.181  
 
















George’s 1020 635 373 37% 59% 
Montgomery 580 340 214 37% 63% 
Baltimore 
County 569 408 241 42% 59% 
Baltimore 
City 565 417 164 29% 39% 
 
                                                 
 179  See supra Figure 11. 
 180 Compare WILNER & SHEFTEL-GOMES, supra note 37, at 8 (highest) 
with SHIN & WILNER, supra note 89, at 6 (default judgment rate for New York 
City Civil Courts, lowest). 
 181  See supra note 114 and accompanying text. Collectors have also been 
accused of intentionally targeting the poor, an allegation which they deny. Sue-
in Hwang, Once-Ignored Consumer Debts Are Focus of Booming Industry, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2004, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB109865776922954118.html. 
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Figure12182 shows the rate of affidavit judgments in the 
four Maryland counties for which the most claims were recorded. 
Montgomery County and Baltimore County are more affluent ar-
eas,183 while Prince George’s County and Baltimore City are less 
affluent with higher minority populations. Yet Baltimore City 
has the lowest rate of default judgment and Montgomery the 
highest. Baltimore City defendants appeared less frequently than 
those in Montgomery and Prince George’s and as frequently as 
those in Baltimore County. The difference in rates cannot be ex-
plained as a result of case loads, affluence or the willingness of 
defendants to defend themselves. The likely explanation is that 
there are differences in judicial attitude. While some judges might 
believe that a failure to respond weighs heavily in favor of entry 
of a default judgment, the rules for granting affidavit judgment 
suggest otherwise. The law requires that before a judge may enter 
affidavit judgment, the debt buyer, like any other plaintiff, must 
present supporting documentation, plus an affidavit that affirma-
tively shows that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
asserted, that the affiant has personal knowledge of those mat-
ters, and that the affidavit is based on admissible evidence.184 
One surprising finding is that between the time of the 
Caplovitz Consumers in Trouble study and the today, rates of de-
fendant participation and representation appear to have dropped, 
while at the same time courts have become progressively less will-
ing to grant default judgments. This may reflect a difference in 
methodology: Caplovitz’s rates were based on interviews with de-
fendants, and he counted those who received advice from a law-
yer,185 while this and other modern studies detect only cases in 
which a lawyer has actually entered an appearance on behalf of 
the defendant in the court records. 
The reason for the failures to appear remain a mystery 
that will no doubt attract future study. In debt buyer cases, one of 
the most common problems is that defendants do not recognize 
                                                 
 182 Using the sample data gathered in this study. 
 183  For readers unfamiliar with Maryland geography, Baltimore County 
and Baltimore City are distinct jurisdictions. The Baltimore City jurisdiction 
occupies a roughly square area of 92 square miles centered on downtown Bal-
timore. Baltimore County surrounds Baltimore City and stretches north to the 
Pennsylvania border, occupying 682 square miles. 
 184  MD. R. 3-306. 
 185  Id. at 222-224. For Caplovitz’s methodology, see id. at 8-10. 
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the name of the plaintiff or the amount for which they are being 
sued.186 Further, most of the debts involved are unsecured credit 
card debts, which are not associated with any particular object. 
This disconnection, combined with the general lack of personal 
involvement in modern consumer credit already noted above, 
may be a significant cause of defendant default. 
This suggestion may seem at odds with the results of 
Bezdek’s 1992 rent court study. As noted, defendants failed to 
appear just as often 20 years ago in Baltimore City rent court as 
they do in the contemporary collection courts studied in this arti-
cle.187 Surely being subjected to eviction from one’s home is more 
serious than being sued on a credit card. This may be so in some 
respects, but Bezdek found that, at least by the time the tenants 
reached rent court, the rental relationship was impersonal: there 
were “a few instances of ‘mom-and-pop’ landlords bringing legit-
imate claims . . . . These actions were few and far between. The 
primary operators in the rent court are a class of business 
agents . . . .”188 
Bezdek noted the contrast between the deference accorded 
to landlords’ agents in rent court and the impatience the court 
generally showed towards tenants.189 Censorious attitudes toward 
debtors were also reported in 2006 by the Boston Globe, includ-
ing routine threats of imprisonment.190 The Globe concluded that 
“[o]ften, debtors are treated with less courtesy than the accused 
felons in the criminal court across the hall, and their rights are 
less respected.”191 
                                                 
 186  Debt Buyers, OFFICE OF THE MINN. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
http://www.ag.state.mn.us/Consumer/Publications/DebtBuyers.asp (last visit-
ed Sept. 4, 2013) (“Some people who are sued by debt buyers do not recognize 
the name of the party who is suing them and ignore the lawsuit.”); WILNER & 
SHEFTEL-GOMES, supra note 37, at 7 (“People sued by [a debt buyer] are often 
faced with lawsuits that allege unfamiliar debts, filed by debt buyers whose 
names they do not recognize.”); Clinton Rooney, Defense of Assigned Consumer 
Debts, 43 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 542, 545 (2010) (“[W]hen a debt buyer un-
known to the consumer sends a letter claiming to be owed a debt . . . [t]he con-
sumer likely does not even recognize the name on the envelope.”). 
 187  See supra Figure 11. 
 188  Bezdek, supra note 108, at 556. 
 189  Id. at 551-52 (noting that landlords and their agents were given some 
control over the timing of their cases within the rent docket while tenants were 
forced to wait with no indication when their cases would be called). 
 190  Healy, supra note 35. 
 191  Id. 
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Behavior of this kind undermines procedural fairness and 
damages public trust in the judiciary.192 Neutrality and respectful 
treatment are among the key elements of the procedural fairness 
that our society expects.193 Too often, courts fall short of this 
standard in collection cases. When, as the Boston Globe put it, 
dignity faces a steamroller in the courts,194 it is perhaps unsurpris-
ing that the public lacks confidence in the judicial process and so 
fails to engage with the courts by filing defenses. 
Whatever the real reason for default by defendants, and 
despite the decline in defendant participation and representation, 
the comparison to Caplovitz’s day is in one respect hopeful. 
Then, the defendant almost invariably suffered a default judg-
ment.195 Today, a default judgment is no longer a foregone con-
clusion. Again this change may owe something to the subject 
matter of these disputes. Back then, most plaintiffs were original 
creditors suing on installment-type credit agreements, not debt 
buyers suing upon on open-ended credit card accounts. The dif-
ference may simply represent the generally poor quality of debt 
buyer suits. However, the growing evidence is that the lawsuits 
filed by original creditors are just as shoddy and poorly docu-
mented as those filed by debt buyers.196 
However, it seems more likely that procedural changes 
                                                 
 192  The importance of procedural fairness in public confidence in the judi-
ciary was noted in a white paper of the American Judges Association in 2007. 
Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public 
Satisfaction, 44 COURT REV. 5 (2007). 
 193  Id. at 6. 
 194  Healy, supra note 35. 
 195  In over 90% of cases, a default judgment was entered for the Plaintiff. 
See supra Figure 11. 
 196  See, e.g., Complaint for Permanent Injunction, Civil Penalties, Restitu-
tion, and Other Equitable Relief, People v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 
BC508466, 2013 WL 1915821 (L.A. Cnty., Cal. Super. Ct. May 9, 2013) (alleg-
ing various debt collection abuses); Consent Order, Order for Restitution, and 
Order to Pay Civil Money Penalty, In re American Express Bank, FSB, No. 
2012-CFPB-0003 (Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau Oct. 1, 2012), available at 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012-CFPB-0003-American-Express-Bank-
FSB-Consent-Order.pdf (Consent Order between CFPB and American Ex-
press for “deceptive debt collection practices"); Consent Order, In re JPMorgan 
Chase Bank, N.A., No. 2013-138, (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury Sept. 18, 2013), available at 
http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2013-138.pdf (settling regula-
tory action by OCC for abusive debt collection); Mississippi v. JPMorgan 
Chase & Co., No. 3:2014cv00054 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 22, 2014). 
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since then are largely responsible. When Caplovitz examined his 
cases, confession of judgment was still possible in consumer cases. 
In fact, Philadelphia cases were excluded from Caplovitz’s analy-
sis of outcomes in court because those cases were all confessions 
of judgment.197 Default judgments were entered as a matter of 
course and without judicial oversight when defendants failed to 
appear or answer.198 Today, entry of a default judgment is no 
longer supposed to be a rubber-stamping exercise which occurs in 
all cases of default. 
While data about representation can be found in most of 
the studies in Figure 11, only Bezdek discusses the impact of rep-
resentation. She finds representation an unconvincing explana-
tion for the disparity between the success of landlords and ten-
ants.199 The comparison is somewhat complicated because 
landlords can be represented by non-lawyers, and these “land-
lords’ agents” are in fact professional representatives.200 Only a 
handful of tenants in Bezdek’s sample were assisted, three by 
lawyers, six by friends or relatives.201 All of them managed to 
avoid an entirely negative outcome.202 Bezdek sees this as a sign 
that it may not be representation per se which improves the ten-
ant’s outcome.203 Unfortunately, informal assistance by non-
lawyers was beyond the reach of this study,204 so the importance 
of brief advice and assistance compared to full legal representa-
tion remains fertile ground for further research. 
                                                 
 197  CAPLOVITZ, supra note 23, at 192. 
 198  Id. at 201-03. 
 199  Bezdek, supra note 108, at 562-63. 
 200  MD. CODE ANN., BUS. OCC. & PROF. § 10-206(b) (West 2011) (provid-
ing that “a person . . . representing a landlord” need not be admitted to the Bar; 
the same exception is conferred to those representing a tenant if the person is a 
law student or employee of an organization funded by the Maryland Legal 
Services Corporation). 
 201  Bezdek, supra note 108, at 562. 
 202  Id. 
 203  See id. at 563 (“The fact that the tenants who were assisted by non-
lawyer friends or relatives achieved more success than the average tenant in-
vites the speculation that qualities other than legal representation may account 
for some tenants’ persistence in court. Qualities such as encouragement . . . and 
assistance in presenting [the matter] oneself may account for a more successful 
hearing. . . . Perhaps the significance of assistance to tenants . . . is chiefly the 
breaking of [the rent court’s] rhythm [of landlord-plaintiff claims].”) 
 204  Such assistance could only be discovered by interviewing defendants, 
and perhaps by observing hearings. 
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IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  Acknowledge That We Have a “Shadow System” for 
Collections 
An adversarial process overseen by a neutral judge is the 
supposed hallmark of the American justice system.  Each side has 
a lawyer who is a zealous advocate, and a judge presides while a 
judge or jury determines the facts, applies the law and decides an 
outcome. Any cracks in the system are supposed to be filled by 
public defenders, legal aid lawyers, court appointed lawyers, or 
lawyers who are providing pro bono representation. 
The reality is quite different. For consumer defendants in 
collection cases, there is a “shadow system” which is characterized 
by a lack of public awareness, a lack of formal rules, a lack of 
understanding on the part of defendants, and a lack of legal rep-
resentation. In short, our broken debt collection system is scarcely 
recognizable to the uninitiated. Before we can move forward, we 
need to fully accept the fact of just how far the system falls short 
of traditional notions of due process.  
B.  Restore the Rules of Evidence to Ensure Due Process. 
Due process concerns are implicated when courts do not 
require that claims be proved by admissible evidence authenti-
cated by someone with relevant personal knowledge about the 
evidence being proffered. Debt buyer lawsuits have proliferated 
because courts have not insisted on this, preferring to wield the 
rubber stamp rather than engage in the more demanding job of 
acting as guardians at the gates. Too often, debt buyers do not 
have admissible evidence to prove that a consumer was ever lia-
ble to a bank or that the debt buyer has standing to sue, and do 
not have reliable evidence to prove damages. Debt buyers often 
do not have the proof because the banks either did not have it or 
chose not to transfer it at the time the portfolios of debt were 
sold.205 
The percentage of default judgments obtained by debt 
buyers exists because judges have allowed relaxed and informal 
                                                 
 205  Holland, supra note 37, at 272; Peter A. Holland, Defending Junk Debt 
Buyer Lawsuits, 46 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 12, 14 (2012). 
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procedures—originally intended to streamline small-stakes cases 
brought by self-represented litigants—to be used by some of 
America’s most powerful financial services corporations, fully 
lawyered up, against the very lawyer-less litigants whom small 
claims procedures were supposed to protect.  
C.  Revisit the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
The study of collections lawsuits is largely a study of what 
happens in the absence of an adversarial system. Because civil lit-
igants do not currently have a right to counsel, the question for 
the profession becomes whether we are doing the right thing even 
when nobody is looking. In light of the abundant documentation 
of litigation abuses, and the knowing sale of junk debt by banks, 
the legal profession as a whole needs to step up and fix the prob-
lems. The Preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
states that lawyers have “a special responsibility for the quality of 
justice.”206 This special duty is partially spelled out in the Model 
Rules. One such rule is Model Rule 3.3, which prohibits lawyers 
from knowingly making false statements of fact to a tribunal or 
failing to correct false statements of fact to a tribunal.207 
The Rule 3.3 problem arises because lawyers for debt buy-
ers refuse or fail to advise the tribunal about the contents of the 
Purchase and Sale Agreement between the bank and the debt 
buyer, which often specifically disclaims any warranties (includ-
ing warranties of title), and which in some cases state that the ac-
count balances are only “approximate.”208 It is difficult not to 
conclude that lawyers who represent to a tribunal that there is a 
precise balance owing, when in fact the balance is only “approxi-
mate,” are engaging in a misrepresentation of material fact or a 
                                                 
 206  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 1 (2011). 
 207  Id. at R. 3.3. 
 208  See supra notes 15, 78 and accompanying text. See also Jeff Horwitz, 
Bank of America Sold Card Debts to Collectors Despite Faulty Records, AM. 
BANKER, March 29, 2013, 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_62/bofa-credit-cards-collections-
debts-faulty-records-1047992-1.html (explaining that the sales contracts be-
tween banks and debt buyers often disclaim “‘any representations, warranties, 
promises, covenants, agreements, or guarantees of any kind or character what-
soever’ about the accuracy or completeness of the debts’ records” resulting in 
the sale of claims for balances which are only approximate, that may have al-
ready been paid in full or discharged in bankruptcy). 
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failure to correct a previous misstatement of material fact. Com-
ment 2 of Rule 3.3 states that the purpose of the Rule is “to avoid 
conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative pro-
cess.”209 Comment 7 to the Rule states that in general in a civil 
case, “if necessary to rectify the situation, an advocate must dis-
close the existence of the client’s deception to the court or to the 
other party.”210 Comment 7 goes on to state that if the Rule were 
otherwise, “the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being 
a party to a fraud on the court.”211 Comment 13 to Rule 3.3 states 
that “the advocate must disclose” cases of actual perjury by a cli-
ent regarding a material fact.212 It is difficult to discern how robo-
signed affidavits containing forged signatures, or which falsely 
claim to be based on personal knowledge, do not constitute actual 
perjury by a client, which are the subject of mandatory disclosure 
by the client’s advocate. 
Based on this author’s anecdotal experience, many debt 
buyer attorneys report that they don’t receive the Purchase and 
Sales Agreement as part of their file. This is not satisfactory, be-
cause to be competent, a lawyer must always investigate the rele-
vant facts and law prior to filing a lawsuit.213 As stated by one 
court, in a collection case “where an attorney commences suit in 
so uninformed a manner that he is ignorant even as to what law 
governs his suit, it cannot be said that he has undertaken a level 
of review sufficient to satisfy even the most general requirements 
of attorney conduct . . . .”214 
It is understandable that as more and more secret Pur-
chase and Sale Agreements become public, the faith of the courts 
and the public continues to be shaken. In the context of robo-
signing directed by a foreclosure lawyer, Maryland’s highest 
court recently stated that “even the slightest accommodation of 
deceit or lack of candor in any material respect quickly erodes the 
validity of the process.”215 Once the procedural validity starts to 
                                                 
 209  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 3.3 cmt. 2 (2011). 
 210  Id. at cmt. 7. 
 211  Id. 
 212  Id. at cmt. 13. 
 213  Id. at R 1.1. 
 214  Miller v. Upton, Cohen & Slamowitz, 687 F. Supp. 2d 86, 98 (E.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
 215  Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Dore, 73 A.3d 161, 178 (Md. 
2013) (quoting United States v. Shaffer Equipment Co., 11 F.3d 450, 457 (4th 
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erode, “the people are then justified in abandoning support for 
the system in favor of one where honesty is preeminent.”216 It is 
up to the profession, in an act of self-governance, to restore a sys-
tem in small claims courts “where honesty is preeminent.” Debt 
buyers profit by filing vast numbers of suits that are at best un-
substantiated and at worst fraudulent. They do so with the co-
operation of lawyers, who also profit from this behavior. The atti-
tude that all of the known problems of proof in debt buyer cases 
can be ignored unless a defense is mounted is no longer accepta-
ble. 
D.  Revisit the Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
The Model Code of Judicial Conduct needs to be updated 
to reflect the modern reality of self-representation and of sophisti-
cated lawyers running roughshod over self-represented litigants. 
The Model Code requires impartiality and fairness in general but 
does not specifically refer to self-represented litigants.217 The 
Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct more clearly establishes the 
power of judges to make reasonable accommodations to ensure 
that self-represented litigants have the “the opportunity to have 
their matters fairly heard.”218 Comment 2 to Rule 2.6 in Maryland 
talks about ensuring that self-represented litigants have the “right 
to be heard.”219 
These rules assume that there is a self-represented litigant 
who is participating and wants to “be heard.” But the problem 
with debt buyer lawsuits—and with small claims in general—is 
that the vast majority of defendants do not show up and ask to 
“be heard.” The Rules need to be updated to give judges guidance 
for appropriate conduct dealing with unrepresented parties in the 
vast majority of cases where they do not appear in court. One test 
of our system is what happens when both sides have excellent 
lawyers who are zealous advocates. But an equal test, which im-
pacts a far greater number of people, is what happens when one 
side consistently does not have a lawyer (or does not even show 
                                                                                                                 
Cir. 1993)). 
 216  Id. 
 217  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 (2011). 
 218  MD. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R.2.2 cmt. 4 (2010). 
 219  Id. at R.2.6 cmt. 2. Note, however, that no such comment exists in the 
ABA Model Code. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.6 (2011). 
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up), while the other does. How do we ensure a level playing field 
amidst so great an imbalance of power? Judges need further 
guidance in this area to ensure that our system can pass both 
tests. To that end, the Model Code needs updating. 
E.  Revisit the Law School Curriculum. 
When they first observe the shadow system, students and 
practicing lawyers are surprised to discover that there are some-
times court rooms with no judges in them, trials with no witness-
es, and hallways filled with lawyers presenting defendants with 
settlements which are doomed to fail. The surprise comes not on-
ly from due process and equal protection concerns, but also from 
the fact that “nobody ever told me about this” either in law school 
or in law practice. The fact that it is unknown and not discussed 
is precisely what makes it a “shadow system.” 
While the philosophical debate over the proper balance 
between theory and practice in law schools continues, access to a 
lawyer becomes less and less obtainable for the majority of Amer-
icans in the majority of cases.220 While lack of access to lawyers 
has many causes, one cause is that students, professors, and even 
most lawyers are totally unaware of the shadow system. 
Law students should be exposed to the shadow system early in 
their law school career. This requires only a few hours of direct 
courtroom observation, which would not interfere with existing 
course demands. There would be several immediate benefits to 
the student, to the academy and to the profession. First, it would 
break the myth of the adversary system that is assumed through-
out law school. Second, it would immediately infuse first year 
classes with real world issues of legal profession and procedure. 
Third, it might serve as a deterrent to judicial rubber-stamping 
and restore some balance to proceedings when judges know that 
students are watching and reporting back. Fourth, it would in-
spire more future lawyers to think creatively about how to im-
                                                 
 220  See e.g., Thomas D. Morgan, Foreword: Training Law Students for the 
Future: On Train Wrecks, Leadership & Choices, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 297 
(2009) (foreword to a symposium issue on “the ‘train wrecks’ that legal educa-
tion may soon experience”); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 
(2012); I. Richard Gershon, In Ten Years All New Law Schools, 44 U. TOLEDO 
L. REV. 335 (2013) (suggesting that the creation and destruction of new law 
schools will drive innovation). 
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prove delivery of legal services to underrepresented client popula-
tions, either through pro bono, low bono, fee shifting, counter-
claims, or class actions. 
One of the reasons that appellate cases are valuable as 
teaching tools is because the lawyers did such a great job in de-
veloping the facts and exploring the law. The fact that most peo-
ple in this country today do not have and cannot afford a lawyer 
is relevant to our understanding of how the law develops. For ex-
ample, very few pro se plaintiffs can survive a Motion to Dismiss 
in this post-Iqbal world we now live in.221 And even if they could, 
it is impossible for most consumers to bring their disputes to 
court, because of the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence about 
forced arbitration.222 Early exposure to the shadow system would 
demonstrate to students that the life of the law is neither logic nor 
experience; it is both, and the constant struggle to establish the 
proper balance should begin with students gaining early exposure 
to the law as it exists for the vast majority of our citizens in the 
vast majority of cases. 
F.  Adopt Simple, Common Sense Reforms 
Just as Lord Coke predicted, the sale of causes of action 
has created confusion and a multiplication in the number of law-
suits.223 One of the goals of this paper is to spark debate on these 
and other proposals for reform. Below is a partial list of some 
common sense reforms. 
                                                 
 221  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao 
of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 
553, 629 (2010) (noting that 85% of motions to dismiss on pleading grounds in 
pro se cases were granted following Iqbal); c.f. Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal 
Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in Employment and Housing 
Discrimination, 100 KY. L.J. 235 (2011). 
 222  Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent 
Consumers from Presenting Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 SW. U. L. REV. 
87 (2012) (explaining the hurdles established by Supreme Court arbitration ju-
risprudence); Beth Davis, Mandatory Arbitration Agreements in Long-Term 
Care Contracts: How to Protect the Rights of Seniors in Washington, 35 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 213 (2011) (reporting how claims of elder abuse are sup-
pressed by the use of arbitration clauses in long-term care facility contracts in 
Washington state). 
 223  See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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1.  Ban “as is” sales contracts and require full documentation. 
If banks do not have the requisite proof to pursue the 
claims in their own name, they should not be allowed to sell off 
accounts with full knowledge that the purchaser will use the 
courts to extract default judgments, despite the fact that there is 
no adequate data to prove the debt. Arguably, if improvident 
lending or irresponsible consumer behavior ultimately results in 
default, then any discretionary lawsuit should be pursued by the 
bank that was allegedly harmed, not by some unknown investor 
in claims. But if debts are to be sold, they should be sold whole: 
complete with all of the information that the bank would need if 
it were suing in its own name. This requires proof of liability for 
breach of contract and proof of contract damages. Such proof 
would include the underlying contract, a running balance on the 
account, and a breakdown of the principal amount of money bor-
rowed, plus a separate itemization of all interest, all late fees, all 
over limit fees, all add-on products, all maintenance fees, and any 
other fees that were added to the principal amount. It is notable 
that recovery of any fees or interest are limited to those bargained 
for in the underlying contract, which is missing in almost every 
debt buyer case.  
Another option would be to limit any recovery to the 
amount of the principal amount of the original extension of cred-
it, and to specifically exclude from recovery all finance charges 
such as interest, late fees and over-limit fees which cannot be 
proved by a written contract. 
2.  Require full disclosure of un-redacted forward flow 
agreements 
The Purchase and Sale Contracts (also known as “For-
ward Flow Agreements”) between banks and debt buyers must 
no longer remain secret. For all the cases that are currently in liti-
gation in which the bundle of debt was sold “as is” with all faults, 
and with explicit disclaimers of warranty, this fact needs to be 
widely publicized to the defendants and to the courts. All debt 
buyer lawsuits should contain a copy either the original Forward 
Flow Agreement (at forty or more pages this may prove incon-
venient) or a link to a website that hosts the specific forward flow 
agreement which goes with each account. An easy example is the 
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agreement between FIA Card Services, Inc. and CACH, LLC 
which was highlighted by the American Banker for its explicit 
disclaimers of warranty, including that the debt may not be 
owed, may have been discharged in bankruptcy, may be the re-
sult of fraud, may not be supported by documentation, and that 
the balance amount is only “approximate.”224 Can lawyers, in 
their role as “public citizens having a special obligation to ensure 
the quality of justice” think of any possible justification for hiding 
from the tribunal the fact that the bank disclosed at the time of 
sale that the consumer may not be liable, and that even if liable, 
that the stated amount of liability is only “approximate”? 
3.  Adopt statutes mandating reciprocal fee shifting in consumer 
contract cases 
Most consumer contracts for goods or services state that if 
the creditor files a lawsuit, the consumer must pay all collections 
costs and all of the creditor’s reasonable attorneys’ fees. Legisla-
tures could adopt a statute that states simply that in a consumer 
contract, if there is a provision for attorneys’ fees in the event 
that the creditor prevails, the provision is reciprocal as a matter 
of law. Many states have such a statute already.225 Such a statute 
incentivizes the private bar to step forth and provide a defense, 
when a meritorious defense exists. This should have a deterrent 
effect on the filing of cases that cannot be proven. 
4.  Provide same day lawyers in the courthouse 
If the “adversarial presentation of evidence and argu-
ments” is to survive,226 we must ensure that legal help is available 
to those who need it. Persuading defendants to represent them-
selves will always be difficult if they are forced to navigate a 
strange and hostile system without sufficient advice or assistance 
                                                 
 224  Horwitz, supra note 208; Loan Sale Agreement, supra note 45. 
 225  Jeffrey C. Bright, Unilateral Attorney’s Fees Clauses: A Proposal to 
Shift to the Golden Rule, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 86, 114-120 (2012) (noting the dif-
ferent approaches taken by state statutes which require fee-shifting reciproci-
ty). 
 226  The strength of the adversarial tradition is such that “our entire dis-
pute resolution system depends on the integrity of the participants, who seek 
the truth through an adversarial presentation of evidence and arguments.” At-
torney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Dore, 73 A.3d 161, 178 (Md. 2013). 
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from the legal profession. Even if defendants can be convinced to 
participate in the lawsuits, they will not receive justice without 
legal help. The defendants in this study who did file a response to 
the lawsuit (presumably the most committed defendants) fared 
much worse than those who had a lawyer. At a minimum, con-
sumers sued in collection courts should be able to get some legal 
advice before they enter what has become the lion’s den. To this 
end, courthouse projects staffed by volunteer or legal services at-
torneys have proven highly successful in delivering limited un-
bundled legal advice.227 While this “half a loaf” approach is not 
ideal, it does provide limited ammunition to the astute few self-
represented litigants who aspire to a fair fight in court. Further, 
because the evidence in debt buyer cases is inherently shoddy (as 
evidenced in the “as is” Forward Flow Agreements) these trials 
should be easy for a self-represented litigant to win, with a little 
bit of help and coaching from a lawyer. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has provided a window into the opaque world 
of consumer defaults in debt buyer law suits.  Forty years ago, 
David Caplovitz described the economic condition of consumers 
who defaulted on their debts to the businesses that had extended 
them credit. Much of what he observed applies equally to today’s 
defendants in debt buyer lawsuits.  Like their counterparts from 
forty years ago, today’s defendants lack adequate health insur-
ance,228 lack a safety net sufficiently broad to prevent the trau-
matic financial consequences of sickness or unemployment,229 and 
lack the tools to avoid financial scams.230   
                                                 
 227  Maria Aspan, supra note 55 (noting the work of the ProBono Resource 
Center of Maryland). 
 228  TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE 
WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT (2001); 
Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa A. Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking the 
Debates over Health Care Financing: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2001). 
 229  Robert J. Landry, III & Amy K. Yarbrough, Global Lessons from Con-
sumer Bankruptcy and Healthcare Reforms in the United States: A Struggling 
Social Safety Net, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 343 (2007). 
 230  Contemporary concern focuses on payday loans. See, e.g., Marcie Ge-
ffner, Payday loans ‘unaffordable’, BANKRATE.COM BANKING BLOG (Feb. 22, 
2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.bankrate.com/financing/banking/payday-loans-
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The bench, the bar and the academy each have a role to 
play in shining the light onto the shadow system, thereby paving 
the way to much needed reforms. 
  
                                                                                                                 
unaffordable/ (reporting the findings of the Pew Charitable Trust); PEW 
CHARITABLE TRUSTS, HOW BORROWERS CHOOSE AND REPAY PAYDAY 
LOANS (2013), available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Safe_Sma
ll_Dollar_Loans/Pew_Choosing_Borrowing_Payday_Feb2013.pdf; Gretchen 
Morgenson, Find the Loan Behind the Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/business/find-the-loan-behind-the-
loans.html?_r=0 (noting recent pressure by state regulators on online, payday 
lenders). 
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APPENDIX A: FULL PROTOCOL OF STUDY 
I assigned the gathering of data relating to certain debt 
buyers and years to clinic students, who then entered the data in-
to a pre-formatted Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. Some students 
gathered data on a single debt buyer in a single year, while others 
gathered multiple debt buyers and years. For example, an indi-
vidual student was responsible for gathering data regarding 200 
lawsuits filed in the District Court by Midland Funding, LLC 
during the 2009 calendar year. Under this system each student 
gathered between 200 and 800 records. Any questions regarding 
the study’s protocol were addressed as they arose. 
Data were gathered from Maryland Judiciary Case Search 
(“Case Search”), which is a searchable online database containing 
the actual court dockets. Case Search can be searched in a num-
ber of ways: by case number, filing date, jurisdiction and party 
names. Pursuant to the written protocol, students gathered data 
by searching for the named debt buyers appearing as plaintiffs in 
civil cases in the District Court of Maryland.231 Without any pa-
rameters for dates, Case Search will display a maximum of 500 
search results for any given search. Because many debt buyers 
filed large numbers of cases, it was necessary to limit each search 
to a specific month or even a specific day.232 Using a random 
number generator, a case was then randomly selected from the 
                                                 
 231  Using Case Search to search for party names is problematic: Case 
Search will only detect literal matches for part or all of a party name. Search-
ing for the proper legal name of a debt buyer would often miss many cases 
filed by that debt buyer. For example, “Pasadena Receivables, Inc.” will often 
appear in court records without the comma or period, without “Inc” or with 
simple spelling errors such as reversing the “i” and the “e” in “Receivables”. To 
address this problem, the first word of the plaintiff’s name was used in the 
search criteria. For example, for “Pasadena Receivables, Inc.” the search term 
was “Pasadena”. Any search results unrelated to the debt buyer were ignored. 
Because the name of each debt buyer was rather unique, the number of unre-
lated search results were minimal and statistically insignificant. 
 232  First, students were instructed to select a random month, by requesting 
a random number between 1 and 12 from http://www.random.org. The student 
would then enter a data range in case search covering that month. For exam-
ple, April 1st, 2009 to April 30th, 2009. If this search produced more than 500 
results, the student would request a new random number between 1 and the 
number of days in the selected month, and then conduct the search again for 
the day selected. 
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cases filed in the District Court in that month or on that day.233 
The student would copy the specified data from the record on 
Case Search.234 
After the data were gathered, quality control checks were 
performed and, as discussed below in detail, any outliers were 
removed. First, some aberrant cases were removed and replaced: 
duplicates of cases which despite randomization, were sampled 
more than once, cases which were transferred to another jurisdic-
tion,235 which simply recorded the entry of a foreign judgment,236 
where the complaint amount was zero or where the principal 
amount of the judgment was greater than the complaint 
amount.237 Second, the consistency of spelling was checked to en-
                                                 
 233  Again, the randomization was performed using http://www.random.org. 
 234  The data were: Case Number, Plaintiff, Court, Filing Date, Case Sta-
tus (Active, Closed or Bankruptcy), Complaint Amount, Judgment Type (Affi-
davit Judgment, Consent Judgment for P, Consent Judgment for D, Default 
Judgment for P, Default Judgment for D, Trial Judgment for D, Trial Judg-
ment for P, 3-506(B) Dismissal upon Stipulated Terms, Rule 3-506 Dismissal, 
Rule 3-507 Dismissal, Complaint Dismissed by Court) (this category was left 
blank if no judgment/dismissal had been entered in a given case), Judgment 
Amount (this category was left blank unless a judgment against D was en-
tered), Judgment Interest (this category was left blank unless a judgment 
against D was entered), Attorney Fees (this category was left blank unless a 
judgment against D was entered), Court Costs (this category was left blank un-
less a judgment against D was entered), Other Amounts (this category was left 
blank unless a judgment against D was entered), Total Judgment (Judgment 
Amount + Judgment Interest + Attorney Fees + Court Costs + Other 
Amounts), Whether post judgment interest at the legal rate was awarded, 
Whether the Defendant filed a Notice of Intention to Defend, Whether the De-
fendant had an Attorney, Defendant’s address, Defendants zip code, Plaintiff’s 
Attorney, Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Firm. 
 In all cases the case number was preceded by an asterisk, to prevent the 
spreadsheet software from truncating case numbers that began with a zero. All 
amounts were entered as simple numbers. All yes or no data were recorded as 
their “Yes” or “No”. 
 235  These were removed because the case record did not cover the whole 
course of the case. 
 236  Id. 
 237  These two categories were removed because they seemed to indicate 
substantial errors in the data recorded on Case Search which would harm the 
accuracy of the results in general. Note that cases were only removed if the 
judgment amount (i.e. the amount of the complaint for which plaintiff ob-
tained judgment), not the total judgment, was greater than the complaint. The 
former indicates an error, while the latter is caused by the addition of costs, in-
terest and attorneys’ fees. 
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sure that data could be properly analyzed automatically.238 Third, 
one particular judgment type was rechecked: dismissals under 
Rule 3-506. There appeared to have been some confusion among 
students that led to some Rule 3-506(b) dismissals being wrongly 
recorded as Rule 3-506 dismissals. All cases with the Rule 3-506 
judgment type were re-checked by a teaching assistant and any 
errors in judgment type were corrected. 
Finally, 10% of the sampled cases were re-checked against 
Case Search for errors. A total of fifty-one errors or omissions 
were detected. The errors were not material, relating to defend-
ants’ addresses or plaintiff’s attorneys or firms. All of these errors 
were corrected before subsequent analysis. 
The last step before analysis of the data was to check the 
quantitative data for outliers. The quantitative variables are 
“Complaint Amount,” “Judgment Amount,” “Interest,” “Costs,” 
“Other Amounts,” “Atty Fees,” and “Total Judgment.” Each cate-
gory had many data points beyond two deviations of the mean 
and even three deviations of the mean. For example, in “Com-
plaint Amount,” 0.023% of data fell outside two standard devia-
tions of the mean, and 0.009% of data fell outside three standard 
deviations. Scatterplots revealed that many of the quantitative 
variables were generally normally distributed. 
Rather than arbitrarily remove data outside of two or 
three standard deviations, only a couple of very extreme data 
points were removed (all other data generally behaving normally) 
to provide the most robust presentation of data. The only data 
outliers removed were a complaint amount of $252,260 (approxi-
mately 48 standard deviations greater than the mean), and a costs 
datum of $650 (approximately 30 standard deviations greater 
than the mean). These data were very likely the result of typo-
graphical recording errors in Case Search itself. 
The complaint amount outlier was not a case that resulted 
in judgment against the defendant; therefore, none of the judg-
ment related variables were impacted. The average complaint 
amount with this outlier included was $3.050.38 with a standard 
deviation of $5,149.06. Removing this outlier decreased the aver-
age complaint amount to $2,993.73 with a standard deviation of 
                                                 
 238  Zip codes were also limited to five digits, and any quantitative data 
which had been entered as currency were changed to a simple number to aid 
computer analysis. 
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$3,520.56. 
The costs outlier was removed and the mean for costs 
without this outlier was imputed in its place. Imputation was 
necessary because completely removing this datum would have 
provided a less precise measurement of the average total judg-
ment category, which includes costs. 
 
 
